A Treatise on Political Formation

[Eamon Valda]

Introduction

This treatise offers a basic philosophical analysis of the political state of the planet and explains: 1) the state of nature and its problems; 2) the alternatives to the state of nature; 3) what, how, and why alliances constitute; 4) the nature of individual relations; 5) the nature of inter-alliance relations.

I. The State of Nature

The state of nature exists when an individual actor is not part of or defend by a formal political structure. In the state of nature, any given actor has the natural tendency to preserve his survival by any means. Unrestricted politcally, the individual is free to do as he pleases. Moreover, by existing singularly, any other individual or group will also possess the power of coercion over him - the threat of the use of force. Therefore, the state of nature is dangerous and uncertain.

II. Options for Dealing with the State of Nature

Individuals are, for the most part, rational.

The rational individual seeks to maximise their benefit against their cost - maximise their utility. The state of nature is, in most situations, irrational: the costs of potential and constant war, combined with the opportunity costs of not joining any group, are significantly high to encourage alternative solutions.

The only individual solution is to enter peace mode. However, peace mode imposes harsh economic costs on to the actor. Therefore, peace mode will tend to be undesirable because, even though its accounting costs are low, its economic costs - the loss of growth, specifically - are high.

The second alternative is a group solution; individuals congregate to form political structures and protect their interests from outside interference and for mutual benefit. This is what an alliance is.

III. The Alliance: A Defensive Organisation

Alliances may possess many different constitutions and formats. Even so, they are united by a basic principle: the primary function of an alliance is to act as a defensive organisation.

An alliance provides a more optimal solution to the problem of the state of nature. By combining the political powers and ambitions of a group of individuals, an alliance can: 1) provide basic protection for its unified membership; 2) forward an avenue for economic growth and stability; 3) hold an instrument of influence and coercion over those who exist outside of the alliance. These factors are the reason why an alliance creates a higher utility alternative to the state of nature.

IV. Formation of Alliances and the Nature of Individual Relations

Individual relations are tightly bound. Within a certain degree of economic restriction, any individual actor can interact with another instantaneously. Additionally, even though the alliance can provide positive incentives for its co-actors, an individual need not rely on an alliance for an effective military or economic satisfaction (e.g.) one can still achieve optimal trades, aid, or create one's own defenses which could be equivalent to any individual in an alliance). The consequences of these two properties: 1) alliances may be formed or disbanded nearly instantly; 2) individuals may join or leave nearly instantly; 3) alliances face a heavy issue of both recruiting, indoctrinating, and maintaining membership.

Alliances may, again, have different groups, associations, or specific historical reasons for their formation. However, an almost universal pattern in their creation consists in the joining of a small group of individuals that forms a constitution - a basic contract outlining the principles, policies, and operation of any given alliance. To join an alliance, one must always agree to the basic principles of this contract; failure to adhere or attempts to impair the contract result in punishment.

Punishment must occur from breaking a contract because all agreements between individuals, when an agreement consists of a current exchange for something in the future (i.e.) the surrender of individual sovereignty for future protection and economic aid), depend on the risk of uncertainty. If no alliances upheld their contracts, and failed their membership, not only would no one join them, but no one would create an alliance at all! Thus, a contract also constitutes a written assurance that the alliance will carry through on its promises.

V. Why Alliances Contain Different Stratums of Power and Specialisation

It also naturally occurs that alliances tend to have different members holding various responsibilites and authorities within its framework. In terms of a written contract, the most influencial party will usually be the ones who formed it (i.e.) the 'old guard' of the New Pacific Order). As contracts age and new actors infuse themselves into the defensive organisation, power is less and less about their ability to change these contracts to their maximal utility but, rather, to enjoy the security and success within that power. Essentially, power can perpetuate itself; even though not all members might agree with a given contract, the benefit they derive from it can more than accomodate their grievances.

Different levels of experience, skill, social links, personality, and active participation in an alliance's structure will influence how power becomes distributed, regardless of the system in place. Although alliances may tend to emulate one another in their function or form, there are essential components to any basic group: 1) the responsibility of executive administration; 2) the responsibility of policy creation and change; 3) the responsibility of relations with foreign individuals and groups, diplomatically and militarly. Executive administration forms the basic neural network of the alliance and is charged with the implementation and enforcement of any policy and sends signals to membership; policy creation and change forms the basic mind of an alliance since it acts to organise, coordinate, and determine the principles, goals, and attitudes of an alliance; foreign affairs is the body of the alliance because it interacts with outside entities - including defense. In these three essential operations, the defensive organisation will be apt to choose the best it has by its own systems of determination. Because these systems have different methods and each of these operations contains a large array of sub-functions, a hierarchical institution is generally used; each level contains different levels of authority and responsibility. Their existence and the need for effective candidate selection is the main reason, beyond the original contract, of different power stratums and member specialisation.

VI. Inter-Alliance Relations: Monopolistic Competition and the Creation of Cartels

The relationship between alliances is a form of monopolistic competition in that it satifies two necessary conditions: 1) there is free entry and exit of alliances within the system; 2) that, due to their inherent historical, economic, political, and social differences, no two alliances are perfect substitutes for each other. Monopolistic competition, in inter-alliance relational terms, means that we exist in a system where many alliances offer analogous (similar in function) but not homologous (similar by exact features) services. Alliances have an incentive to make their product dissimilar: the more substitutable two alliances are, the more likely a person would choose to join either interchangeably. In this way, an alliance can maximise its own manpower profit through differentiation. Moreover, differentiation is more than acceptable when individuals will hold different beliefs and will design their political systems to emulate them.

The state of monopolistic competition is not too unlike the state of nature because alliances will tend to act as a united whole in operation and these 'wholes' are entirely free to any action, including war. Since alliances are, foremost, defensive organisations, we will again see these individual alliances act in ways to preserve their own survival. Alliances will tend to co-operate with one-another when they feel such action is mutually profitable; alliances will tend to antagonise when they feel co-operation is costly to their objectives. This can occur for many different reasons: alliances may hold different morals, values, and beliefs; alliances may be politically, diplomatically, or militarily at odds; an alliance may pre-emptively strike perceived threats. Regardless, the struggle for power is a generally a greedy, bloody, and merciless affair.

These associations of alliances are cartels: attempts to combine influence to hold control over some variable. Though the size and purpose of these treaties may differ, cartels are, like individual actors, mostly rational. Cartels attempt to control geo-political variables by force, economic prowess, ideologies and antagonisms, political means, or social associations. Cartels, unlike alliances, do not always require a written contract to formalise their rules but most do. Struggles between cartels (blocs, defensive partners, friends, et al) always hinge on maintenance of their power position. The ultimate goal of any defensive organisation and, indeed, any cartel would almost always be to monopolise their position and thus maximise their ability to self-defense. Such a monopoly was held, for example, by New Pacific Order in the red sphere for quite some time; their sovereignty over this area removed some political rights of their non-consenting constituents but also took them out of the state of nature by restricting technological raiding and the formation of other red alliances - a monopoly on power.

VII. Cheating, Disunity, and General Problems With Cartels

Alliances join cartels seeking to maximise their own benefit. Often, benefit is not optimised by obeying the rules or policies of the cartel or some of its members. 'Cheating' occurs when one alliance breaks the rules or the cartel agreement (i.e.) PIAT, MDP, NAP, etc.) for their own benefit. Cheating is the most significant detriment to the existence of cartels: when no one believes that one will carry through with their promises, then there is no incentive to associate. Thus, it makes sense that cartel agreements are most often created by means of some initial bond, friendship, or mutual need that existed prior to the agreement because then the cost of such cheating will become higher. Additionally, the possibility of cheating stresses an essential characteristic of our politics: the need for unity in cartels. The danger of disunity outlines potential destruction and vulnerability. Again, the primarily defensive organisation will survive at all costs; disunity is a hinderance and risk factor in this objective.

Furthermore, survival for an alliance is not merely physical. Indeed, recall that alliances constitute their own principles and ideologies - unique purposes of their own existence. To some degree, alliances will be apt to rather destroy themselves physically than surrender this purpose: for it is much better to be destroyed than to never truly live at all. This is the main reason why many consider it paramount to uphold the integrity of written agreements and defend friends. Is such a decision rational? Yes - if the preservation of the individual is a goal of each nation, then to preserve not only its own body is decisive but so too the beliefs it holds for the 'good life'. Therefore, cartels can be threatened not only from benefit deriving from physical risks but also from ideological and moral conflict. Disunity will tread the path of destruction within these agreements. The best method, in this sense, to prevent such an outcome is to pick friends wisely and on the terms of real associations or ideological similarties.

Conclusion

This treatise has ventured to determine the basic nature of politics on the planet. Firstly, individuals exist in a problematic state of nature where the risks are tantamount. Alliances are the most stable alternative of individual existence. The basic form of an alliance is as a defensive organisation. Nearly all alliances are formed from contracts but the power of the contract itself is reserved to its creators; power structures are formed when the alliance seeks to fill its three main functions and uses a system of determination to complete this task. Like individuals, alliances will tend to associate as a means to preserve their livelihood from external interference through cartels, groups which attempt to use their influence to control some variable factor. Cartels will struggle with one another, clashing when their objectives, principles, or positions are in danger. However, cartels can be weak associations because cartel members can 'cheat' by breaking their rules or the agreement. If the members of a cartel are disunified, it is likely that its proper function - defense - will be compromised.

Edited October 3, 2009 by Eamon Valda

[Gork]

Overall, this looks like a sound application of political theory. I want to ask, though: what do you perceive as the roots of inter-alliance conflict? Is it necessary exclusively because of the limited availability of resources, that are assigned a value by an alliance's practical or ideological position, or is there a greater degree of uncertainty and accident that should be considered?

[Eamon Valda]

Overall, this looks like a sound application of political theory. I want to ask, though: what do you perceive as the roots of inter-alliance conflict? Is it necessary exclusively because of the limited availability of resources, that are assigned a value by an alliance's practical or ideological position, or is there a greater degree of uncertainty and accident that should be considered?

I think it deserves consideration. Firstly, although there exists a limited availability of political/economic power resources based on ideological and social differences, not all conflicts are the result directly of this. For example, take two alliances A & B. Let's say they hold similar political ideologies and are of equal size. We can determine, at this point, it is unlikely that a conflict will arise due to ideological differences or due to practical gain (since the costs of this war would be severely detrimental). Moreover, introduce an entire history of events, trangressions, and former power structures and we bring a new face to the social attitudes of both alliances. Additionally, the uncertainty of events is definitely a major problem - even if A & B are the same and are on peaceful terms, if information distribution is uneven or unknown at all, it is likely A & B will take a safer strategy in terms of their relations. Furthermore, consider if an outside event, no fault of A & B, influences their political decisions, ideologies, abilities, or fundamental views of the world. In this way, an outside occurrence could easily alter (if not directly lead to) a conflict between alliances.

Edited September 29, 2009 by Eamon Valda

[Hell Scream]

This seems to have taken a lot of effort to write. I have read parts of it and I must say that I agree with the majority of what I read.

I will read the entire thing later on.

[Yuri Leonov]

You seem to describe quite accurately the behavior of organizations, but this is not the entirety of political philosophy. How do you ascribe the motives of individuals in these alliances? It seems, to me, that the role of the individual in your treatise is solely engaged in enlightened self-interest. You also make the assumption that both individual players and organizations are primarily rational in orientation; while I do not doubt that many people are rational and guided by a cognizant frame of mind, irrationality is a major part of human behavior as is evident by countless progroms, persecutions, and prejudice practiced throughout human history. I would be interested in hearing your opinion as to the political and ideological factors that contribute to an individual's choice of alliance or association and what drives an individual to mass movements and organizations to begin with.

[Eamon Valda]

You seem to describe quite accurately the behavior of organizations, but this is not the entirety of political philosophy. How do you ascribe the motives of individuals in these alliances? It seems, to me, that the role of the individual in your treatise is solely engaged in enlightened self-interest. You also make the assumption that both individual players and organizations are primarily rational in orientation; while I do not doubt that many people are rational and guided by a cognizant frame of mind, irrationality is a major part of human behavior as is evident by countless progroms, persecutions, and prejudice practiced throughout human history. I would be interested in hearing your opinion as to the political and ideological factors that contribute to an individual's choice of alliance or association and what drives an individual to mass movements and organizations to begin with.

Firstly, any individual or organisation is inherently self-interested, to some extent. This is because they both survive and provide utility to their time on the planet by actions which are, simply put, in their interest to achieve. Moreover, not all actions nor people are rational. Additionally, there is no objective standard of rationality when faced with the fact that each individual possesses a unique mind and, thus, a history of prior experience, development, and, therefore, methods of analysis.

Ideologically, as we develop ourselves from a beginning state of nature, where all of our actions must be used for survival, to a state of being which, for the most part, is free from such restrictions, our motives likewise become more diverse. The most basic nation on the planet, from its birth, I believe, would most likely be concerned simply with learning how to run its own affairs and ensuring its existence. Moreover, in this example, once we have gained knowledge, material, and more freedom, we realise our interests and potentials (or those of others) lay beyond this sphere.

Alliances, too, can expand their own horizons and objectives. Though I belive the primary objective of an alliance is to be a defensive organisation, this operation is not mutually exclusive. The ways we interpret and interact with the reality around us causes us to determine certain views about our current status. Even though we can make irrational choices, I feel we only make them because we believe them, in our minds, to be rational (that is, to maximise our own utility) and, therefore, we will be rational. Furthermore, when we have this expanded mindset, we may hold our ethical issues now of importance: caring for social connexions; justice; virtue and vice; rights or responsibilites; consequences and utility; pragmatism. I believe it is these ethical considerations - how reality is versus how it could be - that determines the methods by which we deduce to maximise our utility beyond survival itself. Essentially, once we know we can survive in our environment, our next influence is changing the environment to suit our needs itself.

So, mass movements and individuals, whilst being driven by self-interested motives, interpret what exists around them, deriving input data from subjective experiences, and discern new, post-survival conclusions on changing the nature of their surroundings itself to improve their own utility. Moreover, as they do so, they will bring in new ethical concerns (concerns which are also utile) and thus these factor into their decisions. Therefore, their actions are a mix of basic selfishness and 'enlightened self-interest', as you put it.

[kamino]

a truely great thread!

/subscribe

[Wad of Lint]

Overall, I agree with the majority of your theory. I do however have some issues with section VI. First off, I do not believe there is equal free entry and exit within the system. There is obviously a very strong return-to-scale involved here. This tends to mean those alliances which are established, have a greater ability remain established. So rather than see a play between cartels, I tend to see plays between spheres of influence that revolve around specific alliances.

Second, when it comes to substitution all alliances are substitutions of each other regarding the escape of the issues associated with the state of nature. Past that, we could see possible differences in how close an alliance gets to that state, while still removing the inherent risks of nature. Perhaps then the most desirable one is one which most greatly reduces the risk of the state of nature while allowing the benefits (liberty)? I don't know. Just musing.

Finally, just a question. If we hold to your assumption that everyone seeks to escape the risks involved with the state of nature, what do we make of the alliance system further adding to those risks (tech raids, etc.)? If our motivation is to make nations safer by removing that risk, through the association with an alliance, pacts with other nations, etc.. wouldn't rational individuals seek to make the "state of nature" safer overall, rather than riskier?

[Uralica]

I think you'll be getting a call from Uralikan Yliopisto asking you to do a guest lecture there.

Very well written.

[Eamon Valda]

Overall, I agree with the majority of your theory. I do however have some issues with section VI. First off, I do not believe there is equal free entry and exit within the system. There is obviously a very strong return-to-scale involved here. This tends to mean those alliances which are established, have a greater ability remain established. So rather than see a play between cartels, I tend to see plays between spheres of influence that revolve around specific alliances.

Second, when it comes to substitution all alliances are substitutions of each other regarding the escape of the issues associated with the state of nature. Past that, we could see possible differences in how close an alliance gets to that state, while still removing the inherent risks of nature. Perhaps then the most desirable one is one which most greatly reduces the risk of the state of nature while allowing the benefits (liberty)? I don't know. Just musing.

Finally, just a question. If we hold to your assumption that everyone seeks to escape the risks involved with the state of nature, what do we make of the alliance system further adding to those risks (tech raids, etc.)? If our motivation is to make nations safer by removing that risk, through the association with an alliance, pacts with other nations, etc.. wouldn't rational individuals seek to make the "state of nature" safer overall, rather than riskier?

Well, for the return to scale versus freedom argument, I think the problem is that I haven't defined my 'free entry and exit'. What I mean is this: if one can create an alliance or disband an alliance, then there is free entry and exit. I did not consider the additional factors which make such an action profitable or not, though you are correct to bring this point up. I think I can elaborate on it in a future article =]. I believe that spheres of influence are similar to cartels except that cartels have formal rules and, usually, written agreements to ratify their existence.

I made an error on the substitution statement. What I should said is alliances are not perfect substitutes. All alliances are, basically, substitutes to some degree because of their inherently basic premise (the defensive organisation). Moreover, why does one choose, for example, to join NPO instead of MK? I believe that when people make these choices, the fact that they see differences between different alliances suggests they are not perfect (or even strong) substitutes. Personally, I would agree that the best alliance condition would be one in which on's powers in the state of nature were least infringed upon (you said, for example, 'liberty') but still offered a unified protection. In this sense, I am suggesting a sort minarchism (minimalist-anarchism) but that is my personal preference, not theory =]. And yes, I realise that this political preference is much akin to NSO.

Regarding your third question, not necessarily. Individuals are self-interested. Although they detest the risks of the state of nature, they are not opposed to it for others but, often times, merely for themselves. Whether an individual decides that the state of nature must be eliminated is up to them (I believe it rests of further moral considerations one develops). Furthermore, some individuals will always be in the state of nature (i.e.) sovereign rulers of alliances) since some individual or group must assume these sovereign powers in every alliances (ranging from a dictator to total anarchism). Additionally, people may actually find it profitable to exploit those in the state of nature - again, they are only self-interested. They may not be concerned with others beyond any basic considerations of survival.

Edit: Looks like I used 'perfect substitute'. Still, good point.

Edited October 3, 2009 by Eamon Valda

[Eamon Valda]

I think you'll be getting a call from Uralikan Yliopisto asking you to do a guest lecture there.

Very well written.

Sounds good =]. Thanks.

[Wad of Lint]

Thank you for your clarifications. In general, this was a very enlightening read.

[Rudolph]

This was an incredible and enlightening read.

A most interesting and very sound political theory.

[Kzoppistan]

This is very good.