Special Operations

[king of cochin]

Strategic Air Defense Command is on high alert due to the shooting war between United Isocole and United States of China. The Aerostat radar network is scanning the terrain for any cruise missiles on contour hugging flights, MERAT ELINT aircrafts are patrolling the border regions with their terrascan radars, the Merat AWACS are also on increased patrol to detect any violation of airspace. The Royal Cochin Air Force fighter regiments in USC and UI border regions are on alert to prevent any aircraft from either side to enter Cochin Air Space. They have not taken to the skies but are in forward deployment air bases on 5 minute alert rotation.

[king of cochin]

[u][b]DHRUV BEDH ANALYSIS[/b][/u]

As per the analysis of the results of Operation Dhruv Bedh, Antarctic Warfare Simulation Exercise at Gangothri Province, RCDF HSHQ has decided on following corrective steps.

1. The airbase capability of Air Station Gangothri has been found to be less than satisfactory. Immediate works for expansion works has to be conducted. The run way count at Air Station Gangothri would be increased to three from the present two.

2. Auxiliary Air landing sites must be developed for redundancy. Air Bases with two runways each to be developed at Station Alpha and Station Bravo.

3. Greater air logistic assets to be assigned to Gangothri for civil purposes. Three squadrons of GH44s to be stationed extra in Gangothri. The GH44s need to be Tundra Operation Certified.

4. Greater maintenance required for the Pre-Position Base facilities at Gangothri Base Camp. 35% attrition determined during Operation Dhruv Bedh in mission critical components, which is grossly unacceptable. Quarter Master Command to conduct higher intensity maintenance routine for the pre-positioned equipment and devise better protection doctrine for the equipment. GSHQ recommends under ground warehousing on a distributed nodal basis for the equipment so that climate control costs could be minimized and greater insulation would be possible.

5. RCAF squadron stationed at Gangothri found to lack capability in Tundra operations. Recommend increased training regimen with an increased AWACS interaction. The squadron must also improve stand off combat capabilities without AWACS support. Greater onus to be given to ground combat.

[king of cochin]

Strategic Reconnaissance Agency and National Intelligence Agency have been ordered to retask additional assets for the defense of Louisiana. Naval Intelligence wing of SRA has been ordered to generate up to date intelligence regarding Tahoean fleet formation as well as possible threats to the logistical and deployment fleet movement in Atlantic Ocean.

[king of cochin]

Strategic Reconnaissance Agency and National Intelligence Agency have been tasked to generate a Special National Intelligence Estimate for the Red Army fighting against VDL in Germany. The SNIE must contain primary, secondary an tertiary target lists for possible strikes, and potential sites from where Weapons of Mass Destruction could be launched.

The Strategic Command has been ordered into maximum readiness and greater reconnaissance coverage tasking has been given to European Sector.

NIA has also been tasked to increase alertness of the counter intelligence units with the possibility of United States of China deploying to the VDL front through the Kingdom.

[king of cochin]

The 3rd Shock Army Division and the Border Guard Brigade, Miran is hereby ordered to clear a deployment route for the United States of China armed forces. The static and dynamic defense structures in this corridor is to be deactivated and dismantled on a priority basis so that intelligence regarding these defenses would not be gained by the USC forces.

[king of cochin]

With the conclusion of the German Civil War and the dissolution of FUSR, Royal Cochin Defense Forces reduced overall alertness to DEFCON TWO. Cochin Expeditionary Force Germany and Air Combat Force Germany shall continue to operate under DEFCON ONE Rules of Engagement.

[king of cochin]

[u][b]PROJECT 628
CBWD TEF,
STATION DELTA[/b][/u]

The protocol for bringing these condemned prisoners to the Station Delta was considerably better than the earlier visitors to the facility. Batches of 40 prisoners were brought to the CBWD's Testing and Evaluation Facility in secure weather controlled containers and introduced them through the transfer locks. The testing area has now been converted into a barracks type setting with bolted down steel beds, toilet facilities etc. After the test subjects are acclimatized to the conditions inside the testing area the biological agents would be introduced. After the determined incubation period, special suited and armed medical personnel would enter the testing chamber to apply the antibodies to selected test subjects. As and when the experimentation is completed, the healthy subjects would be subjected to further isolation in another secure building in the base while the testing area itself would be thoroughly decontaminated through incineration.

[king of cochin]

The Cochin-IO SOSUS Network is going in overdrive to detect the transients of the PRC rogue submarine if it ever ventured anywhere near any Cochin territories. The Anti Submarine Warfare defensive networks near the island territories of the Kingdom have also been alerted. Royal Cochin Navy's ASW squadrons of Metac and Merat transports have been assigned to forward deployment bases like NAS Crozet and NAS Ile. St. Paul to sink the submarine if detected and confirmed to be a rogue.

[king of cochin]

With the commencement of active combat with France and their allies for the reconquest of Alsace-Lorraine, the Royal Cochin Defense Forces goes to DEFCON ONE.

[king of cochin]

[u][b]STRATEGIC SYSTEMS MANUFACTURING PLANT
ULUGH MUZTAGH VALLEY
[/b][/u]

With the full year of war time production completed the Strategic Systems Manufacturing Plant has ceased is war time operation and would now go to peacetime low activity status. The war time staff has been returned to their routine duty assignments in Strategic Command.

The following addition has been made to the Strategic Weapons Inventory of Royal Cochin Defense Forces.

GBX2 - 250
GBX1 - 250
GBX5 - 500
GBX4 - 500
GBX3 - 750
GX11 - 2000
GX12 - 2000
GX13 - 2500
GX14 - 5000
C50 - 500
C25 - 500
C30 - 250
C31 - 500 KT KUB warhead
C22 - 50
C10 - 50

The newly produced weapons have been distributed to the assigned Strategic Command deployment bunkers near threat zones, except for the People's Republic of China border regions where pursuant to the denuclearization agreement the weapons are being stored at secondary depots.

[king of cochin]

With the cessation of hostilities in Europe Royal Cochin Defense Forces reduces its alertness to DEFCON THREE. The Defense Condition would progressively be lowered in the coming weeks as the Cochin Expeditionary Force Germany returns to the Kingdom.

[king of cochin]

Royal Cochin Navy and National Intelligence Agency have started the operations of a new Fleet Intelligence Center near the village of Malacca in Car Nicobar island. The new Fleet Intelligence Center is established to increase the monitor the increasing naval activities in the region. The principal intelligence collection tool at the FIC Malacca would be an underwater ELF array. The FIC Nicobar would be titularly in the compound of Coast Guard Station Car Nicobar for cover purposes. The low emission intelligence collection operations from the FIC Nicobar would make any counter detection unlikely.

[king of cochin]

All defensive units in XRC, XPC, TPC, ABR, AND sectors to maintained greater passive alertness in view of the large scale exercises being conducted in the region by United Federation of the East. There will be no increase of alert level, however full DEFCON THREE level of alertness to be mounted in these sectors. Combat units in these sectors are NOT to conduct active alert drills.

[king of cochin]

Royal Cochin Defense Forces decreases its strategic alertness to DEFCON FOUR.

[king of cochin]

In view of the recent hostile declarations by Novak, the Kingdom of Cochin raises its alertness to DEFCON THREE.

[king of cochin]

With the increase in tensions in the world and pattern of hostile statements and movements against the Kingdom, Strategic Command is hereby ordered into DEFCON ONE. Strategic Reconnaissance Agency and National Intelligence Agency are hereby ordered to prepare Special National Intelligence Estimates on UFE, Slavic Federation, Greater Pacifica and Empire of Pravus Ingruo. Fleet Intelligence Center, Malacca and Fleet Intelligence Center, Androth to maintain increased vigil of the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal regions.

[king of cochin]

TOP SECRET

[quote][center][color="#FF0000"][size="4"][u][b]Integrated Defense Policy
Royal Cochin Defense Forces
[/b][/u][/size][/color][/center]

As Commanded by His Highness Kerala Varma, the King of Cochin , Royal Cochin Defense Forces has the primary mandate with regards to the defense of the realm.

The Integrated Defense Policy comprised of Territorial, Maritime and Aerial Defense of the nation. The various individual policies are the mandates of various branches of the RCDF, however are required to perform in an integrated manner at all times. While several aspects of the Integrated Defense Policy has already been enumerated by various responsible branches, certain aspects have rooms for improvements, hence the promulgation of the new policy directives.

The defense of the realm has been divided into three zones of action, Maritime Defense, Himalayan Defense and Xinjiang Defense. This is due to the unique geographical nature of these Zones of Action.

Maritime Defense Zone comprises the coastal provinces of India from coast of Gujarat to Chittagong in Bengal Province, Lakshadweep - Maldives Administration, Andaman - Nicobar Administration and Baloch Province.

Himalayan Defense Zone refers to the plain regions of India, from Gujarat to Assam Province, the Himalayan areas of Tibet and Kashmir.

The Xinjiang Defense Zone refers to the Xinjiang Province and the National Capital Territory.

With regard to Terrestrial defense of the Kingdom, the prime mandate goes to the Border Guards Directorate of RCDF. Border Guards has an already robust constitution and effective defense policies with regards to facing an attack from land. There is unlikely to be any changes to the Border Guard Doctrine or Terrestrial Defense Doctrine.



With regard to Maritime Defense, its application lies exclusively in the Maritime Defense Zone in India. This defense is to be a multi-layered system which is flexible, practical, robust and effective. The onus is on economical passive defenses at the front end defenses,ie, a network of tidal wave generators along the appropriate coastal areas so that the tidal power of the waves can be generated for electricity. Established a few meters off the coast line, these generators would generate adequate electric power for local communities, provide storm shelter, as well as provide calmer channels for local fishing industries to pass through into open seas. The design and layout of these tidal power generators would be such that they would create an effective passive defense against hostile amphibious operations. Local Area Attrition Defense groups organized by National Defense Corps would also ready stockpiles of hedgehogs to be deployed in times of crisis.

Further offshore, at distances of 12 NM, 23 NM, 47 NM, 55 NM from coast lines there would be layers of mines and ISLMM Torpedoes, with mine free channels designated by Royal Cochin Coast Guard. RCCG has the mandate of maintaining these mine fields with waters beyond 60 NM the responsibility of Royal Cochin Navy. Commercial ships transiting Cochin waters would get channels of sailing assigned to them by the Royal Cochin Navy and Royal Cochin Coast Guard through Ministry of Transportation, Department of Shipping.

The network of mines and the passive defense structure provided by tidal power generators is expected to be a delaying factor and not a stopping factor with regards to a determined amphibious assault. Active counter measures in any case would be provided by the network of Astra rail gun systems located every 50 NM along the coast of the Kingdom. The 200 NM range offensive weapons is expected to give an adequate attrition to any enemy force and batteries of POSID AShMs established every 50 km by RCCG stations is expected to give fixed long range defense solutions. A network of Aerostats arrayed around the coast is also expected to provide early warning and targeting capabilities to the weapons platforms. The Astra Systems would be protected by individual AAD batteries and Strategic Command Combat soldiers. They would be further supported by the proposed Static Area Defense Platforms, which are static batteries of 155 mm field guns, installed and operated as camouflaged structures and operated by the National Defense Corps personnel.

All this would be augmented by the Air Defense Network's layers of radars. A total of 47, 200 NM XL12 radars and 6, 400 NM XL117 radars are currently operational in this Zone as part of the Air Defense Doctrine which would contribute to improve the Maritime Defenses.

If and when the Maritime Defenses are breached the mandate for defense rests upon Royal Cochin Army.

In Himalayan Defense Zone, the terrestrial defense is the mandate of the Border Guards and the air defense that of Royal Cochin Air Force. A total of 19, 200 NM XL12 radars and 5, 400 NM XL117 radars are currently operational in this Zone as part of the Air Defense Doctrine.

In Xinjiang Defense, due to the location of Cochin City and number of potentially hostile neighbors, the defense is deemed the highest priority. A total of 27, 200 NM XL12 radars and 5, 400 NM XL117 radars are currently operational as part of the Air Defense Doctrine in this one single province alone.

The Air Defense Doctrine envisions interspersed layers of XL12 and XL117 radars with the HAWK Strategic Radars to provide Air Defense Warning. Dedicated Anti Air Defense Batteries would be stationed along side Border Guard defenses and around all vital industrial and population centers. All vital buildings would have dedicated mobile AAA companies assigned. To support the AAA batteries would be installed primary, secondary and tertiary CIWS systems. Aerial Warning Aerostats would be deployed in all border regions, at the rate of one per 50 kilometers and one per 100 kilometers staggered 60 kilometers to the rear. In terms of conflict Air Defense Doctrine would also make use the the AWACS regiments of HALOBs and MERATs of Royal Cochin Air Force. Threats detected by the Air Defense Doctrine would be interdicted by the Royal Cochin Air Force.

The Integrated Defense Policy is aimed at making any offense against the Kingdom of Cochin a painstaking and costly affair for an aggressor and to negate opportunities for tactical surprise to the aggressors. Using a variety of active and passive defense doctrines, the Kingdom is hoping to establish a multi-spectrum defense solution so that any single form of attack will not cripple our defense. The Integrated Defense Policy is designed by conceptualizing a worst case scenario wherein, the Kingdom of Cochin faces attacks from multiple fronts, ie, a minimum of 8 fronts and an undisclosed maximum. Integrated Defense Policy is not an infallible doctrine and would be subject to revisions as per changing strategic climates, defense necessities and improving military technologies.

[b]MARITIME DEFENSE ZONE[/b]

[img]http://i710.photobucket.com/albums/ww110/gokulvarmank/MarDef.jpg[/img]

[b]HIMALAYAN DEFENSE ZONE[/b]

[img]http://i710.photobucket.com/albums/ww110/gokulvarmank/himdef.jpg[/img]

[b]XINJIANG DEFENSE ZONE[/b]

[img]http://i710.photobucket.com/albums/ww110/gokulvarmank/Xindef.jpg[/img]
[/quote]

[king of cochin]

TOP SECRET
[quote]
[u][b]Anti Air Defense Doctrine[/b][/u]

The Anti Air Defense Doctrine comprises of an Outer Area Defense and Inner Area Defense. Outer Area Defense involves the defensive network of warly warning radars and a interdiction Air Defense Batteries arrayed around the border regions of the Kingdom. The Outer Area Defense has already expostulated as per Integrated Defense Policy of dividing the nation into three sectors, with each sector having interlinked radar networks with strategic depth. The Outer Area Defense's radar networks consists of 200 NM range, XL12 radars and 400 NM range XL117 radars. The interconnecting networks of these radars provide a nearly impregnable Air Defense Barrier along the borders of the nation.

XL12 and XL117 as stationary radar installations and hence are liable to be targeted in an Anti Radiation attack as a precursor to deep penetration strikes on the Kingdom's territory. Thus these are reinforced along the borders by a secondary layer of radars operated by each Border Guard Brigade consisting of a Battalion of Mobile Radar trucks per Brigade and Aerostats which provide a low level air defense potential.

The detection capabilities of the OAD radar network is complemented by batteries of Surface to Air Missiles comprising of SD5, SD4, SD3, SD2 and SD2R air defense missiles. OAD has 5 batteries of each of these missiles discretely and stealthily installed per Border Guard Brigade sector. These installations are naturally camouflaged fixed installations which would receive targeting and terminal guidance from the Air Defense Network and would not have independent guidance systems to prevent them being targeted due to their radiation parameters. These fixed RCAF defense batteries would be reinforced by the mobile SAM batteries maintained by the Border Guard Brigades for tactical low level air defense.

The Outer Area Defense is reinforced by the Inner Area Defense which defines Air Defense in the interior zones of the Kingdom. IAD involves 60 km range XL27 radars which would be installed every 2500 square kilometers in the Kingdom. This network again involves a design such that any specific land area would be covered by at least 2 XL27 radars to facilitate triangulation and redundancy. The XL27 radars are automated facilities that would be remotely controlled by Zonal Air Defense Commands in each Province of the Kingdom. The operation of these radars would also be governed by Air Defense Network. These uniform radar concentration is reinforced by concentrated radar coverage in certain Air Attack Corridors determined by RCAF which are atmospherically and strategically optimum for an air attack on a territory. This includes mountain passes, mountain ranges, strategic hills near cities etc. IAD also involves Aerostat mounted radars for special protection of high density population regions, such as cities, towns etc.

The offensive form of IAD consists of Surface to Air Missile batteries located around every major city and town, power stations, power grid components, major industrial, scientific and commercial facilities, vital logistic and transport corridors and vital defense establishments. High population centers and above mentioned target types would also have automated CIWS batteries arrayed around them in ringed defensive perimeters. IAD includes defense of Astra rail gun batteries.

The third layer of Air Defense is the Strategic Defense Network consisting of HAWK Over the Horizon radars installed at 5 locations in the Kingdom of Cochin, the 5 Bright Star locations and the Anti Ballistic Missile Batteries located around major population, industrial and defense centers.

The concentration of these large number of radars and Air Defense systems would be imperfect without the Air Defense Network. This is a high bandwidth information pathway that connects every single radar and every single offensive weapon platform in the Kingdom. This highly automated protocol has been developed by Strategic Command, Royal Cochin Air Force and Varma Institute of Fundamental Research. This communication network depends on a physical layer consisting of optical fiber cables in reinforced pathways, secure satellite burst communications and Integrated Military Communications Network. Air Defense Network is a form of cloud computing whereby every single radar is a node and an integrated air defense status is created by the network. It is not necessary for all the radars to be online at any time. The information gained by any single radar is simultaneously passed on to the ADN grid by which every radar gets the picture. The protocol is an intelligent system which randomly activates and deactivates radars in the network so that any single radar may not lend itself to be targeted by a hostile force. The random switching nature of ADN also lends it a pulsating nature. The multiple layered defenses means that the redundant defenses would be activated only when the primary defenses in the sector has been destroyed. This destruction would in any way alert the Air Defense Network which can call in reinforcements from RCAF's fighter regiments assigned to the Air Defense Zone.

Threats detected are engaged by the the SAM batteries whose missiles receive targeting information not from a single radar but from the communication network itself. This communication with the missile is maintained either through the launcher itself or through MILCOM network which exists independent of ADN. Thus even if one or more radars in the region is shut down, the missile would continue to be tracked and receive targeting from the other defense communication infrastructure in the Kingdom. The Air Defense Network can also work with airborne and maritime radar platforms with ease. To prevent its incapacitation during EMP attack, all ADN assets have been protected by Class A Silver Shield Protocol and only Silver Shield rated switching gear and hardware have been used.

While XL class of radars use Ionosonders, and Phased Array technology with electronically controlled wave guidance, Hawk Radars use 12MW powered multistatic radar, creeping waves and electromagnetic surface waves for its operations.

Ultimately Anti Air Defense Doctrine is created not to defend against an overwhelming airborne attack on its own, but to provide warning that such an attack is taking place to RCAF Command and provide as much attrition as it can. The Air Defense Network has proven its robustness in several air defense exercies and simulations and survivability against wide spectrum EMP attacks conducted by High Energy Research Institute.

The doctrine and its components are available for sharing with the valued allies of the Kingdom of Cochin.[/quote]

[king of cochin]

A massive construction effort has started near the Cochin – UFE borders in Xinjiang and Tibet as a massive army of earthmovers and construction equipment have camped out along the border regions of the Province. From half a kilometer from the border to 50 kms behind, a massive defensive area is being prepared by the Corps of Engineers of the Quarter Master Command. The first act is the erection of large tent like areas at a height of around 40 feet, anchored additionally to the ground through ropes. This massive sea of reflective Aluminium sheets would ensure that no satellite can know what is going on beneath the tents optically or through radar.

Beneath this massive canopy set up by the expert tent erectors of Royal Cochin Army, the fleet of earth movers are working at will, day and night to construct one of the largest static defensive projects of the Kingdom, surpassed only by the Border Guard defensive infrastructure. At a depth of 50 kms from the borders, this defensive zone would compose of a massive minefield composed of Anti personnel mines, Anti Armor mines, Bali Area Defense Systems, automated area defense turrets for guns, Metalstorm munitions, and MPS8 Surface to Air Missiles besides massive passive defensive structures like Hedgehogs, Caltrops, anti tank ditches. Over a period of one year this defensive structure would be built, however its greatest ingenuity lies under the surface. Unknown to any roving reconnaissance satellite massive tracts of the soil would be dug out and replaced with a special explosive compound with the density of the arid Kumtagh Desert developed by the Research and Testing Directorate of the QMC. While the certain tracts of the minefields themselves have their soil replaced from a depth of 1 meter below to a total depth of 21 meters, the service roads through the minefields have explosive areas of 20 meters depth from a depth of 5 meters. These specially designed incendiary weapons are extremely stable in normal conditions and cannot even be trigger by a direct contact with white phosphorous round. These stable tertiary explosives require a powerful secondary explosive triggered by a primary explosive that is remotely controlled by the elite Border Guard Brigade commanders who guard these borders. The purpose of these explosive yards is to create the earthquake effect by which even if an enemy armored assault blasts through these defenses in force, this final surprise can cripple them. The order of these minefields and explosive yards are staggered in a random fashion so that its layout would not be predictable to the enemy during combat operations. The yards are also being constructed in such a way that extreme safeguards prevent an accidental cumulative triggering of the explosives.

The explosives had been in production for the past several years as part of routine inventory maintenance and now with the defensive construction starting truckloads of the explosives are being brought in to refill the sections carved out of the soil. The density of the explosive would mean that it would not be distinct from the ordinary soil of the region if a remote sensing satellite tried to observe it. The odors of the explosive would anyway be masked amidst the concoction of fumes from the thousands of trucks and earth movers working in the area and once the tracts are filled up with soil, no odors would escape anyway.

Though the giant construction would be impossible to hide from anyone let alone a wily neighbor, the maskirovska is provided aptly by the obvious defenses being constructed in this area. Dotting this massive defensive zone are now being constructed a massive network of bunkers and defensive turrets which would be manned by the Border Guard Brigades of the area, which are now one of the largest in Border Guards, large enough to gain the Divisional recognition by themselves. Though light in manning these bunkers would be heavy in weaponry with easy egress facilities provided by the individual APCs assigned to each bunker. With one bunker per kilometer, there are three layers of bunkers, 4 kms near the border, 2 kms in the middle and 4 kms near the inward boundary for a total of 10 bunkers per kilometer of the border area, ie around 150 combat soldiers for the entire 1300 kms of the border area of Xinjiang with UFE, a total of 15000 bunkers. With the Border Guards manning the defenses, the infantry component would be provided by the Third Shock Army Division based at nearby Miran.

Xinjiang the least defensible province and also the heartland of the Kingdom would now receive one of the most intricate defensive system ever to be designed by the Royal Cochin Defense Forces. With these new defenses supporting the already existing battery of defensive installations and regular army units stationed in Xinjiang, the enemies of the Kingdom would find Xinjiang a very bitter apple to bite.

OOC: While satellites could notice some sort of activity going on, they would not be able to find out what is going on.

[king of cochin]

The Transporter Erector Launcher gradually elevated the missile canister to the launch angle of 90 degrees. The Tatra 8x8 had its suspensions locked into place and the additional support pylons deployed. The windows of the crew cabin were sealed and over pressurized. As the countdown neared zero, the Launch Officer, flicked open the launcher key and at zero keyed the launch.

With a massive shudder the missile burst out of the canister and atop a pillar of fumes started climbing up the thin atmosphere. The mission had timed for the slowest wind speeds in this sector of Sector Delta in Station Gangothri in Antarctica. As the missile clawed up it started angling towards North.

The progress of the missile was tracked by several entities like the two Royal Cochin Navy Missile Range Instrumentation Ships CNS Geetha and CNS Jomol, the three Navigation Test Support Ships, two Kavaratti class cruisers from RCNB Diego Garcia, a network of HALOB AWACS based from the various RCDF outposts like NAS St. Helena, NAS Crozet, FAB Nancowrie, the network of HAWK OTH radars, the Strategic Command section aboard Trisanku Space Station and various Telemetry and Tracking Stations of Cochin Space Research Organization. Angling north from Antarctica the three stage solid fueled ballistic missile conducted midstage course correction to circle away from the Kerguelens Plateau and fly over Ile St. Paul and Ile. Amsterdam. Another mid stage course correction was conducted to prevent over flight over Sri Lanka as the ICBM course corrected over Maldives to over fly Indian Subcontinent from Mangalore. The third stage finally triggered in as the missile crossed over Himalayas. As the ICBM neared Korla, the ABM batteries near Jimsar came online and started launching AIM-SA's at the missile.

With 12 AIM-SA'sm fired the missile was finally interdicted South East of Urumqi. As the debris of the interdicted dummy warhead missile started falling over the Interim Test Range in Gobi Desert, the various Royal Cochin Defense Forces assets deployed to support this test started dispersing for their routine taskings.

The GG25, an 18000 km range three stage solid fueled Inter Continental Ballistic Missile had been tested successfully. Based on the YAMA-2 Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle used by CSRO, the GG25 would replace the GG19s currently in the arsenal of Strategic Artillery Corps. An SLBM version, the GS25 is also being developed with a range of 15000 kms. The Mike class Missile Submarines of Royal Cochin Navy are being upgraded at various naval shipyards to receive the new GS25 missiles.

[king of cochin]

With the commencement of UFE naval exercises in Indian Ocean region, Strategic Reconnaissance Agency and National Intelligence Agency have stepped up the monitoring of determined UFE assets in the region. Particular attention would be made towards any new pattern of electromagnetic or acoustic anomaly emerging from the region, especially any signal sink regions.

[king of cochin]

The Cochin - UFE Border Defense Augmentation program is nearing completion with the maze of explosives all been placed in such a way as to not present a soil density gradient to any reconnaissance platform. The still remaining works include the finishing works on the tunnels and the weapons placement on the bunkers and turrets. The minefields have already been laid, and now the hedgehogs and caltrops are being laid to add the finishing touches. With the forward zone of bunkers already completed, they are being manned by advance teams from Border Guards to familiarize themselves with the intricate defensive system. With the secretive part of the work completed, after a year of being erected the sea of tents are being dismantled to let sunrays fall upon a vastly changed landscape. Any observer would only be able to see a network of static defenses including hedgehogs, ostensible minefields, bunkers and anti tank ditches and berms and not the active defenses or the massive explosive fields underneath.

[king of cochin]

Considering the recent quietening down of Global tensions accompanied by the signature of PIAT with United Federation of Easy and completion of Xinjiang-Tibet Augmented Border Defenses, Royal Cochin Defense Forces is hereby ordered to DEFCON FIVE. Strategic Command shall remain at DEFCON THREE.

[king of cochin]

The nuclear disaster in Mongolia and increasing tensions between Korea and Zargathia causes the Kingdom of Cochin to go to DEFCON FOUR.

[king of cochin]

[center][u][b]FOURTH GENERATION WARFARE DOCTRINE[/b][/u][/center]

Considering the evolving nature of international warfare, Royal Cochin Defense Forces is now formally orienting its forces to meet with the challenges and opportunities of 4th Generation Warfare. Large scale conventional warfare as conceptualized by 2nd and 3rd generation warfare are unlikely to occur much in the present geopolitical scenario however capabilities for 4GW, though not manifestly present should be developed soon taking into consideration future geopolitical scenarios. Dividing 4GW into two, Offense and Defense, the RCDF shall assign specific duties to select RCDF units to be proficient in these duties at very short notices. The training for these units would involve offense and defense in Psychological Warfare, Asymmetric Warfare, Guerrilla Tactics, Insurgency Tactics. Mechanized Divisions for their Infantry/Armor composition would be designated 4GW defense forces with further infantry support from Infantry Regiments. Royal Cochin Special Forces would be the principal offense groupings for 4GW offense. The National Intelligence Agency would be an active participant in 4GW offense and is authorized to raise special units to impart training and develop joint operational doctrines with Royal Cochin Special Forces. Central Bureau of Investigation would cooperate with the 4GW defense units to impart a better understanding of anti insurgency and anti terror operations. NIA is authorized to source Non National Combatants to impart training to the 4GW offense units. The recruitment of these non state actors is to be done in clandestine manner with all aspects of their recruitment and training in Cochin subject to extreme secrecy and discretion considering the diplomatic ramifications of interacting with International Undesirables.