Snippets

I don't think you understand what amorality is. It's not really something I'm going to champion, but at least you should know what it is.

Not taking into consideration whether something is "right" or "wrong" does not mean you take into consideration nothing. It means that you make judgments based on things like efficiency or efficacy of a move or strategy rather than weighting it based on how good or bad it makes you.

Furthermore, amorality does not mean denying the existence of the concepts of right and wrong. While you can certainly do so and be amoral, you won't be very effective. Recognizing that other people have a moral code they follow (or oppose) is information that needs to be taken into account whether you have one yourself or not.

For a slightly tangential but still apt example. I am an atheist. I do not believe that blaspheming matters in any way whatsoever. That said, I'm not going to go cursing the name of god in front of a devout Catholic that I'm trying to befriend. In this case, respecting the name of god does not make me a theist. It just makes me polite.

In the same way, someone conducting their affairs amorally could recognize right and wrong as generally accepted behavioral phenomena and take them into account when planning, without having to ascribe to any set personally.

Though we disagree on the definition, thanks for the thoughtful reply.

What you described as the views of an amoralist appear to me to be those of a moral relativist. Some argue that there is no difference between the two, some argue they are very different.

Maybe I should ask if you believe a distinction can be drawn between a moral relativist and an amoralist?

A moral relativist does not believe that there is any objective moral code, but still may act according to his own with the knowledge that it is not intrinsically better than anyone else's, at least objectively, even if he prefers it for himself.

Amorality assumes you completely ignore the issue of morals on a personal level. Where the moral relativist does not believe in a universal standard by which to judge moral codes, amorality bypasses the issue all together, with the possible exception of acknowledging that other people do in fact have moral codes.

Yes, a true amoralist can and will recognize that others possess moral codes, but he grants them no importance whatsoever since moral codes mean absolutely nothing to him. An amoralist does not just ignore morality, he outright rejects any consideration of it. A moral relativist does not.

In the interest of Planet Bob, this distinction is important since the point of this blog entry is to argue that what people think is amoralism is really something else. I do not know if moral relativism is a more accurate description, but it is not amoralism. A true amoralist would not believe in concepts like "honoring" treaties or even placing any value on friendships, no matter what their objectives are.

Those who dispute this in terms of strategic action might refer to those who embrace "the ends justifies the mean" as amoralists. Such actors much more closely resemble relativists or even immoralists since they have to recognize values in morality in order to be effective. They are not necessarily amoralists or even nihilists. Indeed, this is why there is still so much debate over whether Machiavelli's prince was an immoralist or an amoralist or even something else altogether.

I have to agree with Delta on this one, and not just to make him feel dirty. An amoralist is someone who doesn't follow a moral code. You have to realise that this doesn't negate the possibility of them being a utility-maximising entity.

So amorality is simply a lack of morals within oneself, it doesn't blind one to the role they play in others, nor to the instrumental value of playing along with them (as a purely self-interested excersise).

If I am amoral (not to lend any credence to those accusations) I am still likely to honour treaties, not for the sake of honour itself, but because violating treaties would be (in most cases) against my long-term self-interest(no one would trust me).

And indeed, you might find this in a great many cases, since morality develops over time for practical reasons; namely to hold a system together by internalising its norms. Similarly things like friendship have instrumental values (the value depending on what one considers their interest to be).

Both of you make interesting points. I will put forth that the distinction between an amoral thinker and a moral thinker is illusionary at best. Amorality itself is an illusion unless it refers to some specific set of established morals that it profess not to believe in.

Morality is just code of conduct. It guides people's steps under the promise that it is the best thing to do. Unless a person has lost the capacity for rational thought (i.e., insane) they, too follow some code of conduct. Even if that code is based on flexibility choice and not disregarding choices others deem inappropriate.

Codes of conduct, like assumptions, are created to ease the process of thought and group situations with associated responses. Why, if every single act had to be analyzed from every angle and each reaction taken into consideration, we would exhaust ourselves before the morning paper was even read. Codes allow us to see a situation and apply a prescribed response based on the experiences of past actions.

So even an amoralist, regardless of whether or not they believe in the existence or substance of morality, still follow a code of conduct ~ even it it's just opportunism. Ironic.

I think amorality is a concept that sprung up as a way to combat the prevalent moral authority, but made under a lack of understanding, from a sociological stand point, of what morality truly is. As all four concepts, morality, immorality, amorality, and moral relativism, are heavily invested with multiple meanings and the nuances can vary from person to person, it often difficult to separate the wheat from the chaf regarding what could be considered a solid epistemological model for studying ethics/morality.

One entertaining thing about this discussion is it made me revisit my ethics notes from last semester.

In our discussions then we isolated conceptions like nonmorality, morality, immorality and amorality based on actions and motives as we read various theorists' views and interpretations of behavior.

I see now and accept that the way you both approach the term is the way most use it daily. In the classroom, however, we approached it as a very slippery term, especially since almost every theorist we studied approached it differently depending on their objectives or focus. In most of our discussions amorality dissolved into a philosophical absurdity since, in its literal form, nothing means anything even with action itself seen as pointless.

I also accept that this conception is just one way of considering the term, but it is what I had in mind when I drafted the OP. My definition would require a more careful rewriting to better communicate what I intended.

Also, thanks again for the feedback. I iz lurning.

edit, Kzoppistan is treating it the way we did in class.

Yes, a true amoralist can and will recognize that others possess moral codes, but he grants them no importance whatsoever since moral codes mean absolutely nothing to him. An amoralist does not just ignore morality, he outright rejects any consideration of it. A moral relativist does not.

In the interest of Planet Bob, this distinction is important since the point of this blog entry is to argue that what people think is amoralism is really something else. I do not know if moral relativism is a more accurate description, but it is not amoralism. A true amoralist would not believe in concepts like "honoring" treaties or even placing any value on friendships, no matter what their objectives are.

Those who dispute this in terms of strategic action might refer to those who embrace "the ends justifies the mean" as amoralists. Such actors much more closely resemble relativists or even immoralists since they have to recognize values in morality in order to be effective. They are not necessarily amoralists or even nihilists. Indeed, this is why there is still so much debate over whether Machiavelli's prince was an immoralist or an amoralist or even something else altogether.

You are now confusing immorality and amorality. Those who are immoral reject moral standards. Amorality simply means ignoring any standard of morality as it would apply to judging one's own actions. You can consider the fact that others will think your action immoral, causing negative feedback and potentially disadvantaging you, thus causing you to take the moral route because it is the moral route, but not because you personally place any value on taking the moral route. This is opposed to someone who will choose the moral route because it is the moral route, even though it might not be the absolute best personal move they could make.

When speaking of amorality, there is no consideration of the innate right or wrongness of an action. The fact that it is judged to be right or wrong may be taken into consideration but this does not lend it any extra weight beyond any other consideration. Someone with a strong moral code, on the other hand, will be more likely to place a heavy weight favor an action they believe to be right when determining their options such that the most personally satisfying course of action may not be the one that is ultimately most advantageous.

For an example of how to distinguish amorality from moral relativism, let's try this. Amoral Amy, moral Myrtle and moral relativist Morey live in a society where taking your hat off is the mos horrendous thing you can possibly do. Upon seeing a hatless person, anyone from this society immediately runs up and punches them in the face. No questions.

Amy wears a hat because she doesn't want to get punched. Myrtle and Morey wear hats because they believe wearing hats is the good thing to do.

Amy, Myrtle and Morey go on vacation together to a foreign country. Here, it is considered very rude to wear one's hat indoors. Amy, upon entering a building, immediately takes off her hat. Morey leaves his hat on, apologizes to anyone who takes offense and tries not to judge all the hatless people walking around. Myrtle immediately runs around and starts punching people.

One entertaining thing about this discussion is it made me revisit my ethics notes from last semester.

In our discussions then we isolated conceptions like nonmorality, morality, immorality and amorality based on actions and motives as we read various theorists' views and interpretations of behavior.

I see now and accept that the way you both approach the term is the way most use it daily. In the classroom, however, we approached it as a very slippery term, especially since almost every theorist we studied approached it differently depending on their objectives or focus. In most of our discussions amorality dissolved into a philosophical absurdity since, in its literal form, nothing means anything even with action itself seen as pointless.

I also accept that this conception is just one way of considering the term, but it is what I had in mind when I drafted the OP. My definition would require a more careful rewriting to better communicate what I intended.

Also, thanks again for the feedback. I iz lurning.

edit, Kzoppistan is treating it the way we did in class.

The problem, I have found, with attempting to use philosophical definitions for ethical issues, is that you eventually boil pretty much everything down either to completely arbitrary rule sets or utter nonsense. What it all ultimately comes down to is motivation and motivational sources, but nobody uses any of these terms strictly in that manner and attempting to pin them down thus effectively strips them of any relevant meaning.

So while you are technically correct in some respects, you lose any true sort of communication value the terms contain when using them thusly. Otherwise you can only really judge someone's moral status from the perspective of themselves or someone else. Attempting to do it purely objectively allows all sorts of odd definitions to arise. (And there you have the arrival of moral relativism).

First, a minor clarification. The amoral and not the immoral are the ones who reject standards. The immoral break them with purpose.

Also, yes we are really playing with some slippery fish here since we have such different understandings of the terms, but maybe your example will help us move along some.

In the case of your example, Amy's morality is that for some unknown reason she does not want to get punched. Perhaps she does not like pain. Even expressing that basic aversion or self-interest can be an expression of morality, since she is asserting her desire not to be harmed. A critic might counter that it is not morality since she is not imposing her self-interest on others or simply that self-interest is not the same as morality, while a supporter of this view could argue the opposite.

A true amoralist would not care one way or another if she were punched.

There is just indifference, with no concept of good or bad at all, and no value is placed on even pain or pleasure.

I also am aware that some proponents of your definition argue this point, that amoralists can avoid pain and seek pleasure. However, that is where the argument really unravels for me since some value is asserted in both health and even in life.

The problem with that is that it effectively defines morality to mean any and all motivation. That is not really what the term means. For example:

You may have a personal moral code. You decide to go against that code. You have now acted immorally. However, humans by their very nature take the option they most want for whatever reason at the time of action. You cannot, for example, make some decide in a manner they do not want to except by presenting them with either an option they deem worse for choosing differently, or with an added incentive to choose an otherwise undesired option. In either instance, the choice becomes favorable even if, under different circumstances, it would not be.

Taking this into account and going back to the previous example, the person breaking their moral code must be doing something they wish to do. If a moral code is simply a code of conduct, then obviously their actual moral code allows them to take the action in question and therefore, no matter what you do, you are always acting morally according to your own moral code.

This effectively renders the entire concept of a personal moral standard unnecessary since anything you do is automatically up to par with whatever your standard is by definition. That would mean the only way to measure a moral standard is to relate it to someone else's. This allows you to either follow, break or ignore said other person's at will.

It also creates a contradiction if you assume that people do in fact have personal moral standards that they can act against. If that is true, it means that morality and motivation are not synonymous and that motivations can be created without morals.

It looks like morality is going to be as slippery as amorality is for us.

For the sake of argument, I view morality broadly as what we think we should do, or even more argumentatively as what we should do. To answer your question in the briefest possible way, we can be immoral if we choose to do those things we think we should not do.

Further, motivation actually is central to our understanding of morality, even if it is as basic as asking the question of why we sleep or eat when we do. Are all questions of motivation moral questions? Some theorists argue yes and others disagree. Some stake out classification systems to try to find some common ground.

Are all questions of morality created equal? I don't think so and I suspect that is why we are still writing.

If you can do that which you believe you should not do, then it is possible to have a motivation that does not stem from a moral code, or else you would have no reason to do anything that went against your moral code.

If this is possible, then amorality can exist as motivations not based in morality can occur.

If you can do that which you believe you should not do, then it is possible to have a motivation that does not stem from a moral code, or else you would have no reason to do anything that went against your moral code.

If this is possible, then amorality can exist as motivations not based in morality can occur.

Here is a quick example to rebut or illustrate.

I want to pull an all nighter to get ready for exams. At 3AM, instinct overtakes my immoral motivation to stay awake and puts me to sleep. Why do I call that immoral? It is against my moral nature to go without sleep.

Again, there are theorists that agree with such an example and there are those who strongly disagree with it. There also are theorists who see this as an illustration of amorality.

Yes, but if you're using that as a definition of morality, then it becomes immoral to continue living after you have swallowed arsenic. That's really getting away from any semblance of the root meaning of morality.

Yes, but if you're using that as a definition of morality, then it becomes immoral to continue living after you have swallowed arsenic. That's really getting away from any semblance of the root meaning of morality.

I'm not sure how to read this since something like poison has nothing to do with my will, unless you mean I purposely ingested the poison and I do not think that is your point?

I'm not sure how to read this since something like poison has nothing to do with my will, unless you mean I purposely ingested the poison and I do not think that is your point?

Ok, let me put it this way.

It's 3 am. You fall asleep.

Either A: You passed out, thus rendering your attempt to stay awake immoral, but divorcing morality from any actual choice.

Or B: You chose to go to sleep, making staying awake immoral, but not something that you actually did since you went to sleep, thereby bringing us back around to the impossibility of committing a personally immoral act.

Ok, let me put it this way.

It's 3 am. You fall asleep.

Either A: You passed out, thus rendering your attempt to stay awake immoral, but divorcing morality from any actual choice.

Or B: You chose to go to sleep, making staying awake immoral, but not something that you actually did since you went to sleep, thereby bringing us back around to the impossibility of committing a personally immoral act.

Okay, my example was A since I passed out against my "immoral" will. My choice was present to me over and over again as I resisted the urge to go to sleep.

Those choices disappeared when I passed out from exhaustion.

Instinct was neither moral or immoral since morality for the purpose of this discussion is defined as doing that which I think I should do, not what my instinct might dictate. Another way of looking at this is to consider the role of our presence of mind. So long as I have the power to exercise reason, I have the ability to be moral or immoral. If I lose my mind, I am not sure I can be seen as acting morally or immorally. I think this is also the basis for the insanity defense in criminal trials.

But what if you're sitting there thinking about how you can't go to sleep yet because you don't know the material and even though sleeping would feel really good, you'd fail. Then you pass out from exhaustion.

Did you just commit an immoral act against your will and without choosing to?

But what if you're sitting there thinking about how you can't go to sleep yet because you don't know the material and even though sleeping would feel really good, you'd fail. Then you pass out from exhaustion.

Did you just commit an immoral act against your will and without choosing to?

That's an excellent question I cannot answer. It's also not an excuse I think I'd try to use.

The example was intended only to show how even our most basic motivations can be viewed within a moral or immoral framework. I obviously cannot say whether it is moral or immoral to deprive myself of sleep to pass an exam. Abstractions like this serve mostly to demonstrate how imperfect and weak our perceptive abilities are.

This very imperfect perceptive power is what leads many to "believe" in morality in terms of codes of conduct and what also allows others to question if any morality can exist at all.