[Eamon Valda]

I. Introduction

In my prior paper (http://forums.cybern...showtopic=70126), I outlined a basic philosophy of why and how political interaction occurs. This treatise will attempt to explain the nature of power variables, mentioned previously, and how inter-alliance relations occur and decisions are realised. Ultimately, alliances full within a special subset of decision-making involving many actors and choices. This implies three methods of decisions: fight, negotiate, or restrict. When choosing one of these methods, an alliance will be rational and maximise its benefit.

II. Power Variables

A power variable must be able:
1) To be used by an individual or group to suit their own ends.
2) To be manipulated; it cannot be static.

A power variable must fit these qualities because of the assumption of rationality. Logically, something can only be useful to a self-interested, utility-maximising person or group if it benefits them. Thus, it must accomplish some purpose to their own ends or it would not be useful. Moreover, anything which is unable to be changed cannot, arguably, be used. For example, if I cannot change when events will happen to my nation, then I cannot use them; if they cannot be used, then it is impossible for me to reasonably do so to my own ends. Furthermore, a power variable, as long as it fills these conditions, can be anything.

III. Categorising Power Variables

Though power variables may be broken-down into the two basic compenents aformentioned, no two variables are the exact same. In this way, it will be useful to our investigation to understand their basic qualities. I propose these four groupings:

1) Excludable, rivalrous.
Users of the variable can exclude others from its use; the more one uses the variable, the less there is available for someone else. Example: money held by any given nation. This type of variable is private since only one person has it and is also restricted in its use. Two people cannot simultaneously use the same variable. In the money example, each nation holds its own private amount of funds and no nation can simultaneously use the money held by any given nation. As money is spent, the total amount available decreases.

2) Non-excludable, rivalrous.
Users of the variables cannot exclude others from its use; the more one use the variables, the less there is available for someone else. Example: senate seats. This type of variable is public since it is, arguably, accessed by all but the number of actors who can use such a variable is limited. In the senate seat example, each member of a colour sphere can vote for a senate member without restriction from other senators but there are only three senate seats.

3) Excludable, non-rivalrous.
Users of the variable can exclude others from its use; using the variable does not affect how much of it remains. Example: treaties between alliances. This type of variable is private because each actor possesses it uniquely but the number of actors who can possess it is not restricted. In the treaties example, each alliance will possess a unique set of treaties but, hypothetically, there is no restriction of how many treaties any given alliance could possess.

4) Non-excludable, non-rivalrous.
Users of the variable cannot exclude others from its use; using the variable does not affect how much of it remains. Example: choice of colour sphere. This type of variable is public since everyone has access to it and the number of actors who can simultaneously use it is, hypothetically, unlimited. In the colour sphere example, any given player can change their nation to the colour of their choice and there is no restriction on how many individuals may be on one colour sphere.

IV. Conflicts Arising from Power Variables

A conflict is simply a dispute between any two actors over the use of a power variable. It can encompass any size of group and any scale of variable. The solution to a conflict is not always violent; a solution merely is a final determination of what course of action will occur with the given variable and between the given parties.

The inherent nature of all conflicts between power variables inevitably occurs when any given party attempts to control the variable by changing its current nature and another party opposes. For category 1, a conflict could arise if, for example, nation A sought to use the funds of nation B for one purpose - a purpose not aligned with B's plan. The two nations could negotiate, fight, or simply ignore one another, for example, to come up with a solution to issue. How we reach a solution will be further investigated later in this treatise.

For category 2, a conflict might arise over who will possess and how senate seats will be used. 3 would reach an issue, for example, if a given cartel opposed another or wished to restrict the associations either group made. And, finally, 4 could be subject to the imposition of restrictions or competition of parties on the given sphere. In all cases, again, a conflict must have two parties who are fundamentally opposed over the use of a variable. If we follow the conclusions of what a variable is, it follows that all conflicts are rational and are not static.

V. Possible Decisions in Conflicts: Individual Choices and The Impossibility Theorem

When we decide the restriction of available choices in a conflict, there is an important distinction: individual and group conflict decision-making.

Individual conflict involves, by the definition of this paper, a conflict between two individuals or any two given groups who are only lead, directly or indirectly, by one individual. Individual conflicts almost always will break-down into three choices: 1) negotiate; 2) ignore; 3) force. Usually negotiations are fairly simple when consisting of a one-one method. In the short-run, any of these methods can work. Arguably, in the long-run, option two is difficult, especially is both parties consider the matter a vital interest. Therefore, the two relevant choices are negotiate or force.

Group conflict involves a conflict between more than two individuals or groups lead, directly or indirectly, by more than two individuals, then we enter a new series of problems. The decision-making of such groups will tend to be, all else equal, democratic (since each party is an equal player). There are two types of group conflicts: 1) conflicts with two or less choices; 2) conflicts with three or more choices. Given two or less choices, a democratic decision is possible because a majority must select one of the two choices.

Given three or more choices, I present the impossibility theorem. The impossibility theorem states: given three or more preferences to rank between three or more individuals, any given democratic outcome is impossible because any solution proposed by one party would be vetoed by at least a majority of others. This theorem relies on two assumptions: 1) all individuals are self-interested and rational; 2) all individuals are not determinedly influenced by other parties in their choices. Thus, given parties A, B, and C, and choices X, Y, and Z, if each one picks a unique combination, no one will agree on a specific set of X, Y, and Z.

I argue that the majority of decisions, in the cases of inter-alliance relations, lay within the subset of the impossibility theorem. Therefore, the rest of this paper will focus on solutions and methods of determination for large groups with many choices.

VI. How to Break the Impossibility Theorem

There are a few basic solutions to the indecision raised by the impossibility theorem. Firstly, we have implicatively assumed that all actors are equal in the decision and that their preferences are different.

1) Rise of dictator or oligarchy. If indecision is caused by different parties ultimately having unique preference sets, a solution could be to simply have someone decide which ranking will take precedence over the others.

2) Restriction of preference choices. It is possible that, by reducing choices to two, we could force a majority to exist within a given group.

3) Negotiation of preference choices. Parties can compromise and form a majority by supporting a set of preferences.

Therefore, if this theory of decision-making holds for cartels on the planet, they will tend to follow three patterns of political action: force their positions, restrict the available positions, or negotiate. Any other solution will ultimately become dead-locked by indecision amongst group members. Such indecision will cause disunity and differences - possible new conflicts - to occur.

VII. Decision-Making: Game Theory

Since we now have deduced the three methods by which alliances engaged in a conflict can reach a solution, we must decide how to weigh these choices in a situation and why they choose a solution.

Game theory is a method of determining how 'players' make decisions by analysing possible choices, costs and payoffs, and how individuals interact with their choices. Again, we lay on the assumption of rationality: any given player wishes to maximise their outcome in self-interest.

There are two categories of how we can measure costs and benefits: cardinal (nominal) and ordinal (ranking). Cardinal measurements have quantative value (i.e.) we know that 10 is 2 times greater than 5). Ordinal measurements are rankings but we do not know how far apart rankings are. Cardinal measurements are useful when we can measure some kind of value (i.e.) money, infrastructure, number of alliances, etc.) and ordinal when we can only know the preferences of an actor in a situation (i.e.) ally alliance A, B, or C).

1) Cardinal decisions. Given our three choices and measurable quantites of costs and benefits, we can analyse what choices parties make based on maximised utility. I.e.) Alliance group A demands 500 million from alliance group B. Assume A would win a given war.
A B
Fight 300 -200 (subtract costs of war)
Negotiate 150 -150 (assume that A could get 150 million from negotiation)
Restrict 0 0 (restriction of choices would delay outcomes)

Given this situation, it is obvious A would pick 'fight' and B 'restrict' if neither knew what the other would do. However, if both knew what action the other would take, it is possible they could negotiate (since B prefers -150 over -200 and A may not wish to risk loses from a conflict).

2) Ordinal decisions. Given our three choices and ranked qualities of costs and benefits, we can analyse what choices parties would make. I.e.) Alliance A and B are deciding on what diplomatic terms they should be on.
A B
Fight -1 -1 (both consider war a negative choice)
Negotiate 1 1 (both think making a treaty would be useful)
Restrict 0 0 (both think that doing nothing would leave the situation unchanged)

Given this situation, the choice would be 'negotiate'. This would lead to a treaty. Since most alliances without prior relations have no immediate conflict over a variable, fighting would be both detrimental and to no end. Moreover, if we assume these alliances have some means of inter-member communication, it is likely they could both see a treaty as useful (to solidify their friendship). Finally, they could choose to keep the status quo the same by restricting the choices available, but since they prefer a treaty by ranking, they will choose negotiate.

VIII. Conclusion

It has been demonstrated what a power variable is, how power variables are categorised, and how conflicts arise from these variables. From this, the methods of decision-making solutions and groups it would apply to were deduced. Additionally, it was decided that the main group for inter-alliance relations consisted of many choice, many actor problems. Based on this, the three main options for decision-making were fight, negotiate, or restrict. Alliances will pick whichever option maximises their utility. A future inquiry could be used to determine specifics about the three methods or properly measuring ordinal and cardinal preferences.

This post has been edited by Eamon Valda: 04 October 2009 - 02:37 PM

[Wad of Lint]

Again, a very good read and generalization of how some of the politics work.

I do have some thoughts...
You spoke regarding the use of uncontrollable variables and how they cannot be used as a means to an end. Although these variables might be unpredictable, I believe they can still be used to advance power. More often than not when something occurs in this world, we react to the change in a way which can be most beneficial to us. We can use some change in our surroundings to ensure the advance of our power. Although we cannot plan, but we can still act rationally when such a variable enters into our decision-making field.

I understand the basis of the non-excludable, rivalrous variable, but your example may fall short. There have been times in the past where Senate seats were excluded. Throwing out that example, the only other I can think of off the top of my head is membership. This seems to be the shallowest of all variable categories.

Going back to excluded senates, which have occurred on both Red and Black, brings back another interesting option. In this situation conflict doesn't arise so much due to competition over a specific variable, as moving the variable from one category to another. I find it even more interesting that such a move is possible by an alliance. Just an observation.

The Impossibility Theorem is another good generalization. This is one that is even useful in practice. However, let's not forget that it is possible for a majority outcome to still exist in one category, and the minority be split between two more. We can not always expect an even split for the outcome of this theory to be correct. Regardless, I agree with the general idea the theory is representing.



In regards to decision-making and game theory, ever hear of the prisoner's dilemma?

[Eamon Valda]

Wad of Lint, on Oct 3 2009, 11:04 AM, said:

Again, a very good read and generalization of how some of the politics work.

I do have some thoughts...
You spoke regarding the use of uncontrollable variables and how they cannot be used as a means to an end. Although these variables might be unpredictable, I believe they can still be used to advance power. More often than not when something occurs in this world, we react to the change in a way which can be most beneficial to us. We can use some change in our surroundings to ensure the advance of our power. Although we cannot plan, but we can still act rationally when such a variable enters into our decision-making field.

I understand the basis of the non-excludable, rivalrous variable, but your example may fall short. There have been times in the past where Senate seats were excluded. Throwing out that example, the only other I can think of off the top of my head is membership. This seems to be the shallowest of all variable categories.

Going back to excluded senates, which have occurred on both Red and Black, brings back another interesting option. In this situation conflict doesn't arise so much due to competition over a specific variable, as moving the variable from one category to another. I find it even more interesting that such a move is possible by an alliance. Just an observation.

The Impossibility Theorem is another good generalization. This is one that is even useful in practice. However, let's not forget that it is possible for a majority outcome to still exist in one category, and the minority be split between two more. We can not always expect an even split for the outcome of this theory to be correct. Regardless, I agree with the general idea the theory is representing.

In regards to decision-making and game theory, ever hear of the prisoner's dilemma?

About your first point, can you provide of a variable which is uncontrollable yet would seek to be influenced by powers? You see, I think your description makes sense, only that alliances or individuals won't seek to influence or use it until the moment it is controllable.

I think that my four groupings are basic, yes, but when things such as senate seats are excluded (by a cartel, for example) I believe that's actually the solution being played out to a conflict involving the variable itself, not necessarily a fault in the categorisation of the variable. Moreover, it is true that we could add more detail and classifications to my system (and hopefully myself or someone else will do this in the future).

While it is possible for a majority to exist, it is unlikely, which I guess is what the theory tries to point out, essentially. Maybe I should change its premise to that on unlikely rather than impossible =].

Yes, I have heard of the prisonner's dilemma. I didn't mention it in this article, but I believe it would lay at the heart of two major inter-alliance relational problems: 1) asymmetric information; 2) rational individual outcomes and rational socialoutcomes. For example, if we have a conflict between a couple of groups, a strategy where each group will do its own rational action may actually be, to a total social outcome, detrimental. It is possible that these groups could come together and reach a common solution in their own interests to maximise their collective outcome. This happens all the time, for example, when alliances make surrender terms in wars. Finally, I think the major problem with achieving these socially beneficial outcomes, for the most part, lays in two issues: 1) that alliances or individuals may prefer their own self-interested benefit to a better social outcome; 2) that actors don't possess the information needed to create such an outcome (since it would more than likely involve negotiation). Random thoughts.

[BamaBuc]

Here's the ultimate example of a useful variable that in some cases can't be influenced: Information. Let's say I'm the leader of a small alliance. I hear from my buddy in alliance A that there's a world war brewing. He lays out how the behind-the-scenes maneuvering is playing out, who appears to be siding with whom, etc. As the leader of a small and insignificant alliance, I could not in that instance reasonably expect to be able to influence this war in any meaningful way, either by preventing it from happening or by changing the outcome. I can, however, react. If I feel that my alliance needs war experience, tech, and land, I can align myself with one or more of the alliances that I expect to be on the winning side. I could then, thanks to a variable beyond my control, acquire those other variables. That's just one example... There are countless ways that knowledge and information, even when beyond one's influence, can be useful.

-Bama

[Eamon Valda]

BamaBuc, on Oct 3 2009, 10:54 PM, said:

Here's the ultimate example of a useful variable that in some cases can't be influenced: Information. Let's say I'm the leader of a small alliance. I hear from my buddy in alliance A that there's a world war brewing. He lays out how the behind-the-scenes maneuvering is playing out, who appears to be siding with whom, etc. As the leader of a small and insignificant alliance, I could not in that instance reasonably expect to be able to influence this war in any meaningful way, either by preventing it from happening or by changing the outcome. I can, however, react. If I feel that my alliance needs war experience, tech, and land, I can align myself with one or more of the alliances that I expect to be on the winning side. I could then, thanks to a variable beyond my control, acquire those other variables. That's just one example... There are countless ways that knowledge and information, even when beyond one's influence, can be useful.

-Bama

Thank you. That is an example that, I think, proves your and Wad of Lint's argument correct. I will have to come up with a new thought about how control relates to action in that paragraph.

[Wad of Lint]

Eamon Valda, on Oct 4 2009, 01:35 AM, said:

Thank you. That is an example that, I think, proves your and Wad of Lint's argument correct. I will have to come up with a new thought about how control relates to action in that paragraph.

I look forward to it. These articles have been very interesting to me.

[kamino]

Eamon Valda, you are quickly becoming one of my favorite posters, keep up the great work!

[Eamon Valda]

Wad of Lint, on Oct 4 2009, 10:44 AM, said:

I look forward to it. These articles have been very interesting to me.

Thanks guys. I think my decision to write these articles is that I feel like some academic discussion and debate on the planet (OOC: on the forums) would be quite healthy. I really hope, too, that maybe others will be inspired to write for themselves. I don't expect myself or any one else to be perfect in their arguments or theories, but I feel that discussing them helps foster understanding and knowledge in the system itself =].

Also, regarding your and Bama's point, I think I have realised that, as I put in the definition of power variable, the use of a variable is all that is needed and not control (in Bama's example, the variable could not be controlled but could be used). I am going to edit it now.

[Seipher Caim]

I like the obvious use of economic theory to provide discussion here...
Morgenstern, Buchanan and Arrow would be proud..

I will definitely comment on that later when I have time...
Thanks !

[Eamon Valda]

SeipherCaim, on Oct 5 2009, 11:51 AM, said:

I like the obvious use of economic theory to provide discussion here...
Morgenstern, Buchanan and Arrow would be proud..

I will definitely comment on that later when I have time...
Thanks !

I actually agree entirely.

OOC: Also, we can't mention real world people on this part of the forum =].

This post has been edited by Eamon Valda: 06 October 2009 - 04:55 PM