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This article is best read while listening to the Karma activist's new anthem. Selling the Status Quo "It's better than another treaty announcement thread." So goes out the call of Karma's epigones, characteristically blind to the fact that, far from highlighting the positive aspects of their thread, they condemn the entire state of world politics that they have constructed. So slow, so mundane, so controlled have things become that we are expected to drop on all fours and lick up the crumbs benevolently thrown our way, thanking them for constructing a system where this can genuinely be portrayed as the best we could ever hope for. But only in the most short-sighted and brow-beaten individual, an individual who has become so psychologically dependent on the existing structure of power that they cannot even imagine the slightest systemic change, only they could hold such an excuse in anything but the highest disdain. Our degeneration to this point has become abundantly clear over the past few weeks, as the Mushroom Kingdom carelessly thrashes about in a vain attempt to live up to their former reputation as an 'unconventional' and 'fun' alliance, rather than a status quo power incapable of anything beyond perpetuating what already is. Unfortunately for them their thrashing about only betrays their complete misunderstanding what politics actually is -- the struggle for power. With the global structure ossified to the extent that it is seen as somehow natural they instead begin to tinker around the margins, deeming that doing anything, no matter how contrived or irrelevant, must make them appear once more as the exciting alliance shaking things up. As a result we see them more and more targeting peripheral alliances of minor political importance. They will threaten NSO and express bewilderment when people roll their eyes, then attempt to deflect attention onto the 'evil' NPO and be shocked by a response of yawns and slow head-shakes. But even were they to attack NSO or NPO, what would change on the political scene? They are not challenging a centre of political power, nor risking any of their own in the process. These moves can never be more than an attempt at bread and circuses to the disenfranchised masses, and thus while they are doing something, they are not really doing anything. Grasping at Air This is the mistake that we see so many of the big players make today. Their minds continue to exist in a past where there is MK's side and a competing 'other'. As a result they continue to see the political interplay as being between the strength of their side and a revisionist power that they can attack and engage in political games with. The concern begins to develop when they realise that despite all their fighting they are left feeling empty, the contentment they remembered from days long past and sought to recapture evading them as grasp and catch only air. The simple explanation for this is that there is no 'other' in any meaningful sense of the word. There is no potential political or military challenge, and thus any attack on perceived others means nothing -- there is no political risk and no political victory, only a continuing emptiness as the the form of politics goes through the motions without any of the substance. The only possible outcome from this shadow of what was once politics can be a feeling of 'what has any of this actually meant?' And so the search for politics continues in vain, as those capable of creating it continue to box at shadows, either too blind or too fearful to challenge any of the real pillars of power -- to risk a loss and chase a meaningful win. And this is where we sit, in an apolitical abyss strangled free of oxygen while we bow down in thanks for the poisonous carbon monoxide provided in its place. It's better than boring old carbon dioxide, after all.
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This article is best read while listening to Rico. Discussion on the great existential threat has picked up again since I last wrote on it, but only amongst the chattering classes of the OWF. Alliances which had once shown such concern over our world's future continue to ignore the issue despite rapidly accelerating decline. Moreover, they have conducted a u-turn on the causes and remedies they had once championed by denying the responsibility of powerful alliances. They won't conduct the open diplomacy they once called for, or shift their policies to create the dynamic multi-polar world so many died for. An honest change in intellectual direction, I'm sure. Though one can't help but notice that these changes of direction all seem to have coincided exactly with the powerless becoming the powerful. Of course, once cannot expect the powerful to act in ways opposed to their immediate interests, which is why it was easy to predict the continuation of secret diplomacy, curb-stomps, harsh terms and uni-polarity. It's just a shame when these immediate interests lead to the destruction of the entire world in the post-immediate-term. The oceans are rising.
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With the end of the NSO curb-stomp we have seen the return of the 'beer review' surrender term -- a constant in the New Hegemony's arsenal which has hitherto slipped under the radar of political scrutiny. So why is it there? What is its function? The first response to these questions is that the beer review is 'just a bit of fun', and indeed, this is precisely what it's meant to portray. It allows a group to spend two weeks curb-stomping an alliance down to one third of its previous strength for no justifiable reason, only to leave the sickly-sweet scent of 'a bit of fun' in the nostrils of observers. These observers, of course, quickly forget the two week long curb-stomp and are left with the impression that the attack wasn't so bad after all -- and then what's left but to curse the victim if they dare to complain about the whole series of events. In this manner it is a clever strategy, used to cover up the political realities of the attack. That is, the reality that a whole alliance and over one hundred and fifty individual nations will now have to spend months or perhaps even years rebuilding the wanton destruction that was wrought upon them without cause. The reality that the power structure holds such severe inequities that it allowed, with gusto, a dozen heavily backed alliances to descend against a single competitor. The reality that the attack was so blatant in its character as a hegemonic power-play that even members of the attacking alliances had to struggle to justify it on those grounds, contrary to the stated casus belli. But there is a second, darker reason for the beer review -- to degrade the defeated alliance. It is of little surprise that this particular weapon has been utilised against a community like the NSO, which takes a serious, proud and independent approach to politics. Degradation is not something which exists in the abstract, but rather it is something which is relative to the sensibilities of the individual, and so in order to degrade someone you seek an antithetical activity and force them to act upon it by threat of force. In this process you remove their independence and dignity for all the world to see, demonstrating your strength and their weakness -- and in this case their cultural inferiority as they are forced to bow to the culture of the dominant power. All that the defeated alliance can offer as means of a defence to this degradation is the public acceptance that this was indeed 'fun', therefore perpetuating the initial point of the exorcize The beer review thus has an important dual role in maintaining the current power structure, both by coating its blows in a velvet glove, and by weakening the mental strength and identity of its enemies. At the flip of a switch it changes the popular discourse from one of wanton destruction to one of good natured tomfoolery, where the victim should be thanking and in debt to the aggressor. And at the flip of a switch it turns military defiance into cultural and personal subjection. Far from being 'a bit of fun', it should be seen for what it is: a powerful weapon in the toolbox of imperialism.
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Toppling Tyranny: Hegemonic Hierarchies and How They Collapse
Vladimir posted a blog entry in La Vanguardia Pacifica
The question of the great war is upon us once again, this time asking where the next one will come from. As one would expect, there have been a multitude of responses covering nigh every alliance in the known world, while others fall into despair that we may have reached the end of history for the foreseeable future. But no one has yet dared to transcend the superficial examination of alliance relations and enter a scientific analysis of the great war concept itself. As has been noted previously, a great war is essentially the climax of a revolutionary movement in the process of attempting to overthrow the hegemonic bloc -- that is, the bloc which maintains its place atop the unipolar world. Thus, the coaluetion toppled the NPO, the Initiative toppled the coeluetion, the Unjust Pact attempted to topple the Initiative and was itself toppled by what became the Continuum, Karma toppled the Continuum, and finally C&G toppled Karma. At the most basic level what we can take from this is what has been implicit within most responses: the next great war will be a challenge against the hegemony of C&G/SF. However, more pertinent to the question is precisely how these great wars came about, and in this we find an interesting consistency: the hegemony invariably enters a civil war. Thus, the NPO fell due to its long-term backers, GATO and Legion, aligning against it; similarly, the Initiative fell due to a challenge by elements within it; the Continuum came to an end as a result of several alliances going over to the other side; and finally, Karma met its demise as it broke into its warring component parts. Indeed, the only great war that wasn't broadly brought about by defection was the second great war between the Initiative and the League, and this can be explained by the extraordinary circumstances of several new and large alliances developing simultaneously in that period and destabilising the power structure -- something that would be impossible today. To understand this we must first understand how the unipolar world works. It is invariably defined by a hegemonic bloc that controls international politics -- in our case this bloc is the aforementioned C&G and its sidekick, SF. This control derives in part from raw strength, but primarily from the bloc's central position in the treaty web, which spreads its influence to almost all significant alliances. The way in which this works is perfectly demonstrated by Lord Sharpe's 'BlocNet' (the image at the top of this article), designed at the height of the Continuum's power. In BlocNet we can see that the ruling bloc was largely defined as being made up of the ruling alliances from the various corners of the world, each hugely influential within its own sphere. This parochial influence was then used to create the global influence of the Continuum, which in turn fed back and conferred global influence on the parochial ruler. This is broadly the social structure of a unipolar world, and through it we can see a clearly defined hierarchy made up of three categories of alliance: At the top there are the Core alliances, capable of bending the world to their will by virtue of their place atop the semi-periphery -- there is usually only room for one such alliance (eg. GOONS in the Unjust Pact; NPO in Continuum; MK in C&G). This isn't to say they aren't constrained -- they must keep the semi-periphery on-side -- but they are constrained in a different way from others, enjoying an infinitely greater degree of freedom. The semi-peripheral alliances are those that hold considerable power to bend the world to their will, but are also constrained themselves by the core alliance and other semi-peripheral alliances, each pushing their different agendas. This category is mostly made up of the non-core alliances within the ruling bloc. The peripheral alliances are the great mass of alliances lower down, usually tied to the semi-periphery and core through a system of protectorates, treaties and blocs. However, as the above would imply, within every social structure there are contradictions. The core maintains its position so long as they maintain control over the vast bulk of the semi-periphery, while the the semi-periphery has a constant pressure to advance its own interests at the expense of the core (and itself -- the other semi-peripheral alliances). The result of this is a constant, if often blunt, tension, leading to a constant strain on the core alliance as it battles to simultaneously maintain peace within the semi-periphery, the respectability of the bloc, its own authority, and the pursuit of its own unique agenda. With a skilled core this situation can carry on peacefully for prolonged periods, but in the long run it is unsustainable, and the longer the period carries on the more the dual motivators of grievance and ambition begin to build up. We can therefore begin to understand why the great wars have primarily come from within the hegemonic bloc itself. The hegemonic bloc doesn't rule by virtue of its own power, but rather by virtue of the power of its constituent parts (ie. the ability of the semi-periphery to pull significant sections of the world with them) that is then invested in the core. While an uprising of independent peripheral alliances is nearly impossible due to the numbers required, the likelihood of the uprising being quashed prematurely, and the interfering influence of core and semi-peripheral alliances, it is that semi-peripheral influence that has the authority to shift large chunks of the world at once, altering the very terrain upon which we stand. We can sum up therefore by saying that all blocs, and indeed, the entire world system, is nothing more than a social construct that exists only insofar as it is perceived as advancing the personal interests of each of its members. The hierarchy inherent to any hegemonic bloc makes it vulnerable to a rapid change in this perception, as the core pushes its own agenda while acting as a mediator for the other major players, in the process holding back and alienating those who inevitably lose out. The conclusion to this structural analysis isn't, unfortunately, anything so simplistic as an alliance's name. However, it can tell you where to look. If we are to have another great war, the build up and spark for it can only come from within C&G and SF themselves. The only question is: when will the second tier alliances get tired of being the supporting caste and decide to take their destiny into their own hands. -
Over the past few weeks a number of alliances within the New Hegemony have become increasingly self-aware and confident, believing that they can act with impunity thanks to the power-base sitting under them. The result has been an undeniable and boisterous break with many of the alliances that raised them into that position to begin with, as they explicitly contradict and even mock the beliefs they used to propagate. Every political break coincides with an equally fierce intellectual break, and this case is no different, as the question of morality in global politics is once again propelled into the spotlight. On one side of this debate we have GOONS, \m/ and the Mushroom Kingdom, among others, (hereafter referred to as Unjust Path 2.0) arguing that morality has no place in the world, while on the other we have those arguing that our activities should be considered through a moral lens as well as one of immediate self-interest. It is through this intellectual debate that Unjust Path 2.0 has demonstrated its lack of political understanding. The position of Unjust Path 2.0 is well summed up by GOONS member Alonois, who asserts that "People TALK of morality. They do not ACT upon it." One is tempted to suggest that this is at least superficially true -- after all, nobody has stepped up to end the Red Safari. However, one is only so tempted because moral activity is so ingrained in all of us that it is taken for granted. We can thus take a simple example: the question of war. There has never [or if there has, extraordinarily rarely] been a significant war without a casus belli, strong or weak, and this is precisely because it is known that if one doesn't have a casus belli there will be serious political consequences, ranging from a severe loss of political capital to a declaration of war in defence of the attacked alliance. Moreover, if a casus belli is to be accepted then it must be accepted as having a moral legitimacy by the significant alliances of the world, and this is the very basis of debates on what constitutes a strong and what constitutes a weak casus belli -- one cannot get away with a casus belli over the colour of an enemy's hair, for example, precisely because such a reason has no moral legitimacy. We can go beyond this and question the moral consequences of everything from OOC attacks, to spying, to perma-ZI lists, to honouring treaties, to diplomatic norms and beyond. It is this plethora of social norms and rules that makes up the moral fabric of our world, usually without us even realising it. It must be understood, however, that all these moral norms and rules are social constructs -- they do not exist in the abstract, but rather because they are supported (actively or passively) in the international arena by enough power that violating them becomes politically unwise. Given this, the consequences for violating the world's moral fabric, if you cannot convince the world of your case, goes beyond whether or not there is an immediate military reaction and into the far deeper questions of political support -- for this too is nothing more than a social construct. Alliances enter into treaties and blocs because they see these things as representing their interests, and their interests in turn are merely a representation of their view of the ideal world -- whether military dictatorship or free-thinking utopia -- and their view of the ideal world is in turn merely an extension of their internal culture and morality. Thus, a violation of widely held moral concerns may not bring about immediate military repercussions, but it will nevertheless undermine the idea that alliance interests are advanced through affiliation to the violators, and thus significantly weaken the political ties that act to prevent military repercussions. In the long run it is this process that leads to the hollowing out of hegemonies and ultimately to great wars. Alliances begin to view their interests as being in contradiction to the standing hegemony, and consequently seek out new vehicles and movements -- a new serious of treaties and blocs -- to advance themselves through. It was ignorance of this fact that led to the rapid destruction of the first Unjust Path and in part to the downfall of the Continuum. While Unjust Path 2.0 may be on much more stable ground at the moment, if they choose to believe that morality has no place in the world, and that talk is cheap, then they will quickly find themselves headed for a Wile E Coyote moment, where the political support that they depend on no longer supports the weight of their actions.
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The world has split into two camps over terms, one supporting harsh terms for the defeated alliances and one opposing them. But both groups are brought back together (for the most part) under the idea that after this war there will no longer be harsh terms. This brings us to an odd situation, where those morally opposed to something are perpetrating it ostensibly in order to oppose it. But where does this lead us? The most fascinating thing to watch from my perspective has not been the change in ends -- the terms themselves -- but the change in means; that is to say, in the justifications being used, as 'no draconian terms' became 'the word draconian is relative' (read: the word draconian is undefinable and thus doesn't exist -- nothing is draconian), because it is these, not the terms themselves, that tell us the mindset of those offering them, and that set the precedents. The vast majority of justifications we see today are notable for their generality -- that is to say, for the way in which their logic applies far beyond the current war. In this category we can see examples such as 'the victors dictate the terms, not the losers' and 'we must make sure that they can no longer be a threat'. What the former amounts to is that negotiations shouldn't exist, and that the losing alliance should be willing to accept anything given to it without complaint; what the latter amounts to is a decree that terms in general should be designed to remove any potential future threat by removing their physical ability to ever be one. Of these the latter is the most interesting, for what war isn't fought over a perceived threat? This brings us nicely to the next justification, that harsh terms are only being offered because the NPO (and Echelon, heh) are evil and deserve it. This makes our current situation out to be unique, but is it? In what Great War has the enemy not been made out to be a great evil threat? Even in the 'War of the Coalition' Gramlins, TOP and pals were making the NpO out to be an evil alliance and an immediate threat to their existence that must be crushed and prevented from rebuilding as long as possible. Likewise we go back to the Unjust War and we find the same thing -- the defeated alliances being portrayed as a great evil. And further back we find similar in the previous Great Wars, from all sides. The point here being that alliances don't fight because they think the other to be full of splendid chaps, but because they perceive them to be a great threat and thus evil, with a history of oppression. Not to mention that there is always a concern that a defeated alliance (and especially a massive and well organised defeated bloc) will return for revenge. Of course, from one perspective or another the accusation sounds absurd (just as the current accusation does to the NPO [1]), but it nevertheless exists for the other side, and is used to justify all manner of actions. The foundation on which Pacifican exceptionalism lies is therefore extremely sandy in character, for the circumstances being used to launch it are the same that will exist in all future 'great wars', and indeed, in most future minor wars
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Full Circle: The Death of Idealism and the Return of Power
Vladimir posted a blog entry in La Vanguardia Pacifica
With the NpO's latest switch of sides, SuperGrievances have finally been able to open up their exit strategy to public view. With this opening we can first recognise SG's view that we have officially exited the bipolar world, which forces alliances to fight for the moral high ground (whether they are being genuine or realpolitik) and into a unipolar world, where they can take actions without great concern for damaging political repercussions -- for who is left to stand against them? Naturally the first stages of this transformation are of great interest for everyone, as they demonstrate the world that we will be moving into. Below I present just two statements from dozens that capture the essence of present: "And why should we let an alliance that aggressively and pre-emptively attacked us with no CB at all off the hook just like that? If you want surrender terms I don't think we'd be happy with any term that leaves TOP/IRON sitting with a nation above 1k tech just yet." -- Seerow [1] "They attacked me. They brought war to my alliance, and I have no reason to doubt they will do it again. Clearly lack of a just cause, or any cause at all, is not something to stand in their way. Much as I am not enthusiastic, I must take steps to defend my alliance and my allies before I can advocate peace." -- Archon [2] So what does this tell us? First, the obvious: terms are back. Of course, the word "back" implies that they ever went anywhere, when in reality this is the first war after the Karma War (which itself imposed the harshest terms ever seen). There was no idealistic break, just the continuity one would expect from power politics. Indeed, Seerow's assertion that they will push for all of TOP's nations to be below 1k technology is astonishingly harsh by any historical standard. But perhaps more interesting is the reasoning behind this, implied in Seerow's post and made explicit in Archon's: the removal of a challenger. This is the natural reaction to a war. Whether it is offensive or defensive is irrelevant, since either way the war was brought into being by a conflict of interests that each alliance desires to resolve. The intuitive way to resolve this from the victor's perspective is to physically destroy the defeated alliance's capacity to wage war, by removing technology and preventing growth for as long as possible. In this there is no change of direction from the past, which used precisely this logic. There is no consideration of 'past crimes' or any of the other justifications that were put forth in the last great war. There will be no allowing alliances to rebuild after a war on the basis that 'competition is fun' as was proposed. Rather, security will be put first and competitors cut down to remove the threat the pose. Recognising this logic and its implications, and the complete removal of Karma's normative logic from SG discourse, we can extrapolate future actions quite well, for we have seen precisely where it leads. We, the loyal readers of La Vanguardia Pacifica, on the other hand, are left still waiting for our Jam Tomorrow. -
This is a quick follow-up to Thesis, Antithesis: the Story of a Great War. Structure and Unit In examining our political world we must recognise two basic analytical concepts: structure and unit. The latter, unit, is where most analysts spend their time, carefully (or, more often, not so carefully) examining the characteristics and motives of individual alliances, and making predictions based on these observations. The problem with such analyses is that they typically come to see alliances as living in a vacuum, and thus come to imagine said characteristics and motives to be static properties, leaving the theories developed with zero predictive qualities. The result is what we saw during the Karma war: dreams of multipolarity -- of multiple blocs competing independently, winning and losing wars, and building back up again to challenge the others on an equal footing. The former concept, structure, examines the underlying realities of our world -- when someone mentions international anarchy, they are talking about structure. Unfortunately discussion on this rarely goes past giving it a name. Structure is what provides alliances with their incentives and disincentives: it is what broadly makes a rational action rational and an irrational action irrational. If I walk off a cliff it is only irrational because an element of the physical structure, gravity, will crash me to the ground; if instead I floated walking off a cliff would no longer be irrational. Structural analysis alone cannot tell us when or where a great war will occur (though it can track the development of bipolarity), but rather gives us a wider view as to what will occur over long periods of time. The Great War The past seven months have been a powerful demonstration of structure at work. As we emerged from the Armageddon War we could recognise a number of blocs and forces, including Complaints and Grievances, SuperFriends, Citadel, Frostbite, former 'Hegemony' and many others. Under the unit analysis we would expect each of these blocs to build up independently to pursue their own agendas, but this is not what we saw. As the months rolled on what we saw was clear antagonisms arise between certain alliances and certain blocs as they got in each others way politically and culturally. As these antagonisms developed we saw them suck in greater and greater forces, destroying any proto-multipolarity in favour of a powerful bipolarity. The reason for this is simply that it would not be rational for an alliance to pursue a 'pure' agenda (that is, its whole program) where there is one side of the conflict supporting a part of their agenda and another side supporting an agenda that would be detrimental to their own. As a consequence of this alliances sacrifice their ideal world in order to practically advance its salient elements. This is exactly the same dynamic that we see when alliances join blocs in the first place. Recognising this we can see why nearly every major alliance in the world quickly became sucked into this two-sided conflict, codifying the bipolar world that had been in development. It was only rational for alliances to join a side and fight for the world that would inevitably emerge after it, based on the culture of the victorious alliances. It follows from this polarising that any minor incident will stand the risk of becoming a great war, and so we saw two great war build-ups with similar alliances on each side in less than a month, the second after the first failed to resolve the underlying conflict (much as the 'Third Great War' followed the Second). One could also hypothesise from this that the first attempt to spark a great war via The Pheonix Federation, was a calculated provocation to draw the opposing forces out before they were fully prepared. We can also recognise the disastrous consequences of the New Polar Order's acceptance of peace, which will inevitably be seen by those on its side as a betrayal of their interests, costing them the trust that is so vital in a world of imperfect information and the resultant suspicion. From here (assuming a Complaints & Grievances victory against TOP/IRON/NSO), barring a drastic political move, they will either be forced into the arms of a world order that is contrary to their interests, or be left isolated on the wrong side of the tracks. Likewise we can see the 'two wars' theory being advanced by C&G as the 'second' war is in effect a battle against half of the interests opposed to them, allowing a divide and conquer strategy that could set them up in a powerful unipolar position for some time to come. New Regime, Old World The post-NPO world therefore has served as a slap in the face to unit analysis and a confirmation of structural analysis. We can now see for the first time that the NPO did not cause the great war structure of our world, but rather was only a unit within it, vindicating the predictions made by structural analysis. We can therefore also expect the predictions made to continue with the end of this war. If C&G and their allies emerge victorious a new unipolar world will emerge built in the image of its hegemonic bloc(s), and, over time, a new counter-hegemonic bloc will develop to challenge it before founding a new unipolar regime. We can also expect the consequences of this, as, for example, wars like Athens attacking TPF or NpO attacking \m/ no longer develop into great wars, but remain curbstomps, and the treaty web continues to proliferate.
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Preface This work was written significantly before the development of the current situation, including the pre-war build up. While it is the author's belief that said situation provides an excellent proof of his work, he has chosen to maintain it more or less in its original state, both because he sees little explanatory value in extending to another example, and so that readers can see in the present what has been described through examples of the past. Special thanks to UncleB and Blueline. Thesis, Antithesis: the Story of a Great War One of the few true global pastimes on Planet Bob is speculation about the next great war. Of course, this speculation quickly turns into an argument as it invariably meets no agreement on when it will be, who will be involved, why it will be fought, who will win, or any other matter of substance -- so much so that there is bitter disagreement about such a fundamental question as what a great war even is. But there is one implicit assumption common to all discourse: that history is cyclical and another great war will occur. This assumption, perhaps surprisingly given the track record of popular OWF assumptions, is correct, but, perhaps unsurprisingly, unrecognised and undeveloped. I will therefore lay out a narrative of the cycle of history, thereby providing a groundwork for future discussion. Hopefully in the course of this narrative other answers will begin to become evident, such as what a great war is and how we can predict them. Premising Constants In order to outline the nature of great wars, it is first of all necessary to establish a few constants about our world. The first is obvious: that every alliance is self-serving. In this way we can view every alliance as a force aimed in its own unique direction. These forces attempt to pursue their own subjective interests (hereafter merely referred to as 'interests'), sometimes freely, sometimes at the expense of the interests of a different alliance on a different trajectory. The second constant, following from this, is equally obvious: alliances will unite with others who share the salient aspects of their direction in order to increase their force and minimise the ability of opposing forces to prevent progress. From this we can see how blocs (whether formal or informal) establish themselves naturally over time as vehicles for alliances to pursue their own individual interests. But, of course, since not every alliance has the same interests, multiple blocs must form. Sometimes these blocs won't have immediately contradictory interests and will be able to operate cooperatively, and sometimes they will be in open or hidden conflict with one another. These are our constants and the logical conclusions that they lead to. But at this stage they exist in a vacuum. We know that contradictory blocs will inevitably form over time, and that this will inevitably lead to war between them. But we don't have the context of this formulation. Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis It is extremely difficult to move forward on this subject in the abstract, so let us start from Year Zero, where the New Pacific Order was the first global hegemony, ie. an epoch-defining faction. Since this is Year Zero, we can see the NPO as our first thesis; that is to say, the Order's force was so great that it was capable of overriding the interests of the other, opposing forces. Over time the opposing forces began to believe that the ruling hegemony was a fetter upon its own advancement, and as it became conscious to this the beginnings of an antithesis developed. As time went on there was a constant battle between thesis and antithesis, as each fought to advance itself vis-a-vis the other. We could go into great detail and gain great insight here, but unfortunately it is outside the scope of this brief explanation. This situation was unsustainable. As the antithesis grew in relative strength (both physically and consciously) it had the single-minded goal to remove the fetter upon itself, and the inevitable result was the Great Patriotic War, where the ruling hegemony stepped back and was replaced by the clumsy collective known as the Coaluetion. Through this example we can see the constants in full force, with interests opposing one another, arriving at an irreconcilable contradiction, and resolving themselves through a great war -- it was thus that the constant quantitative battles became a qualitative change: the thesis and antithesis finally arrived at a synthesis. We should interject at this point to add that the first three great wars had a certain peculiarity about them, in that it was possible for all to involve basically the same parties, as they shifted from thesis to antithesis and back again. It is this failure to reach a true synthesis that has resulted in the claim that it was effectively one single great battle that alone deserves the name 'great war'. In this regard we can understand and even sympathise with the claim, especially in regards to the second two great wars, which the author regards in this context as the same great war with a brief interlude. But, that said, if we are to understand a great war to be defined as the antitheses' attempt to overthrow the ruling hegemony and arrive at a new and personally beneficial synthesis, then the great war is a naturally reoccurring event that cannot be pinned down to one specific time period. And so we move on to a second epoch where the Coaluetion is dominant. As noted above, the second epoch had an immediate antithesis in the NPO, which survived the First Great War still in a position of great political and physical strength, and immediately had the necessary antithetical consciousness -- the hostility of the new ruling hegemony demanded it. Due to this the synthesis only lasted a moment before the antithesis established itself and started the battle over again, consciously developing its own bloc to remove the fetter upon it. The result was the Second and Third Great Wars, where The Initiative decimated the Coaluetion and its successors, finally arriving at a truly new synthesis with The Initiative as ruling hegemony. By this point every major political force was a part of The Initiative, and as a result it was unchallengeable. So where was the antithesis to develop? The answer came from inside, as alliances within The Initiative found their interests diverging and The Unjust Path was founded. Again, thesis and antithesis fought it out, with the founding of ~ and the subsequent Unjust War. And again, after this war a synthesis was formed, with The Continuum, One Vision, The Citadel and others. Concluding Constants Through this history we can begin to tease out a few more constants. The most obvious is the pulsating trend of Bobian politics, as it tends towards bi-polarity, then towards uni-polarity, then back towards bi-polarity, and so forth. However, since it only tends towards uni-polarity in a great war situation, when both thesis and antithesis have accepted their incompatibility and have developed the power to each become fetters upon the other, we can say that the trend in peace time is always towards bi-polarity, as forces attempt to advance themselves and inevitably find themselves blocked by another force at some stage along the way. The second is that once the antithesis gathers together enough power, and consciousness of its position, everything moves at a massively increased speed. While at first the antithesis must be careful to survive the opposing forces, during a pre-great war situation each side must move hectically to gather up all forces possible -- destroying any potential multi-polarity in the process -- and capitalise on any minor political conflict. Thus there comes a point where a great war becomes unavoidable, and the only remaining question is on whose terms it will occur. In this way one can conceptualise a much wider situation than just the war itself, looking instead at a 'great war event' that runs from development of the antithesis proper all the way to the development of the synthesis. The third, and perhaps most important, is that great wars do not occur because of a single major (or minor) event or mere ideological clashes, but because a significant force or group of forces has found its material interests (whatever they may be) in direct opposition to the prevailing synthesis. This is perhaps the most significant constant in developing an idea of where the next great war in any given epoch might come from. It also helps us to understand the ways in which groups such as Vox Populi have aided the synthesis by removing embryonic antithetical elements before they coalesced into a genuine antithesis. The Rise and Fall of a Great War Through all of this we can see that there are generalities that are constant to every epoch. Every epoch begins with a synthesis; every synthesis inevitably eventually becomes a fetter upon a significant group; every synthesis becomes pregnant with its own antithesis that is fundamentally opposed to it; every antithesis develops and grows until it is able to take on the synthesis now become thesis; every antithesis, if it grows to such a stage, enters into a political war with the thesis that inevitably results in a great war; every great war, if completed, results in a new synthesis; the cycle starts anew. An obvious conclusion to come from this is that all great wars are naturally power plays, as one force seeks to remove a conflicting force. Of course, every epoch also has its own unique peculiarities that act within this framework, altering the character and time-line in which each of these constants comes about. We can recognise, for example, that while the antithesis developed in the Coaluetion, Initiative and Unjust Path respectively, exactly as the outline above explains, each antithesis came from a different place at different times with ostensibly different motivations. There are material reasons for all of this, but again it is beyond the scope of this work. We can therefore see then the most general of historical outlines, each inch of which would merit a dissertation of its own, perhaps revealing more important commonalities or peculiarities, or shedding further light on those already noted. But despite our limits this outline is nevertheless invaluable, taking the seemingly superficial assumption and providing a structure under it within which further investigation can take place. Taking this structure we can begin to discover why certain epochs vary in this way or that, or understand actions that may hitherto have seemed irrational. Great wars, therefore, tell us a great deal more than who has the biggest guns.
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The concepts of morality and imperialism have found themselves in a peculiar paradox on Planet Bob. Already shouts go up from the gallery, 'Morality and imperialism are mutually exclusive! The only relationship is opposition!' This is the common view from the side of moralism, but it is a superficial one: morality and imperialism, far from being mutually exclusive, are in fact two sides of the same coin. This is implicit in the attacks that some alliances now make upon the global opposition to espionage on Planet Bob -- the claim being that it is a moral view created by the New Pacific Order in its own interests, thus making the dual implications that morality is based on individual interest, and that morality goes hand in hand with imperialism. As it happens this example is incorrect, but the conclusion is isn't, and thus frames our investigation nicely. Defining the Concept The first question we must pose ourselves: what exactly is imperialism? At its most basic it is the dictation of another entity's actions without their consent. How and why this is done varies, but certain constants must always exist, and at the forefront of this is a code of right and wrong. Any apparatus of control necessitates certain rules along which it, and by extension everyone under it, must operate. Of course, such exists inside every alliance and every institution -- in joining any group we agree to abide by its rules, whether written in law or lying unwritten in the culture and ideology of the group. What differentiates imperialism from this is that unwilling groups are effectively forced into abiding by the rules (written or unwritten) through threats, coercion and war. It is, simply put, a demand that everyone should do as a central group demands, rather than a social contract to keep within certain limits for the mutually accepted common interest. And so we enter onto the subject of morality. One can see that every individual, every alliance, and every bloc operates with a morality of some sort or another -- a morality simply being an accepted code of right and wrong. However, what we have seen recently is the coming to the fore of an 'international' conception of morality; that is to say, a code of right and wrong that applies to everyone whether they accept it or not, with the implication that if one does not accept it they are unworthy and should be subject to sanctions. This is a belief in an 'absolute morality' (a morality that is true everywhere always), with the caveat that the centre's morality rather than anyone else's is the correct one. From these two facts the concepts almost seem to be one in the same. If one holds to an 'absolute morality' and demands that it is followed, then we are only one short step from outright imperialism. As the moralist develops and begins to try and push their morality, they begin to pressure, then coerce, and finally force by military means, its acceptance by the wider population. It is here that the concepts of absolute morality and imperialism cease to be different, being as it is a demand for all others in the global community to abide by rules dictated by the centre. Morality becomes de facto law, the moralist becomes judge, jury and executioner of the entire world. Critiquing Absolute Morality Understanding this, the cry goes out from the moralists, 'But there is an absolute morality!' It is difficult to see the rationale behind this claim. If one is to argue that an absolute morality exists, then they must be able to explain where it comes from. Nature? Nature holds no opinion separate from man. God? The closest thing we come to a god, Admin, has stated otherwise quite explicitly. Man? If this were the case, then there would be no need to enforce it, being inherent to every man as it would naturally be. Indeed, even the briefest of observations would demonstrate to the most stalwart moralist that absolute morality is a fiction. Every individual, every alliance, every bloc: all undeniably have their own unique moralities. Sometimes they overlap, but none are the same; and even where there is a lot of overlap on a certain issue, it is never universally held. We can therefore see morality as entirely relative, changing from person to person, from group to group, and that the vision of an absolute morality is nothing more than the forced extension of one's own morality onto others. So where does morality come from? From the moralist's brief observation they should have discovered the simple answer: morality develops inside any group in order to aid in its smooth operation, and from there it is internalised by the individuals involved. That is to say, an alliance develops a moral system by codifying its interests into something that cannot be tampered with by any institution, individual or force. From this we can begin to understand the overlaps and differences: interests that are shared by different alliances, or interests that conflict. We could go on to expand this point at great length, but there is only one important lesson for our purposes here: the pursuit of an absolute morality is not only the forced extension of an individual morality onto others, but in fact the forced extension of the individual's political interests onto others. It is thus that moral outrage always stems from those with vested interests in the downfall of the supposed perpetrator, whether from a desire for revenge over past acts or greed for their place in the international order (whether in the name of power politics or simply reshaping the world in their image). At this point absolute morality can be seen as not only overlapping with imperialism, but leading inevitably to it. Since different moralities have developed to best pursue the interests of different alliances, by negating these one is actually fettering, if not launching a direct attack upon, the political interests of other alliances. Some moralities, of course, outlive their usefulness and become fetters on the host group itself, but the origin nevertheless remains the same. The moralist is therefore pushing for all others to live in a manner that is suited best to his own prosperity at the expense of that of all others. Moralism becomes, by its very definition, imperialism par excellence. Looking Towards Liberation The alternative view takes a far more libertarian stance in the international sphere. In understanding the flaws of absolute morality we can avoid the same dangerous pitfalls, instead recognising that what is best for us is not necessarily seen as best for everyone else, leading to a 'live and let live' policy that pursues one's own interests while allowing others to pursue theirs however they desire. Of course, we have already seen that morality exists in the international sphere in blocs and treaties, but these are opt-in contracts where the individuals involved have the choice to sign or not -- they are not being forced to abide by a code of right and wrong, they are finding their interests best served through partnership and compromise (usually coinciding with a moral overlap). Any actions taken by the respective alliances in this are a free transaction in pursuit of their interests as options (whatever they may be) are weighed and judged. In this way a free market of moralities and interests develops, each advancing its own interests while accepting that others will to do the same. But, and there is always a but, while we can accept the benefits of this state of affairs existing throughout the international sphere, it must always end as soon as another's face begins -- that is to say, your right to advance your interests can never involve attacks against me. Thus while one must take a live and let live approach, they also must reserve the right to respond when their security is threatened by another -- it is not a one way street. But this caveat of self-defence exists only for the alliance's directly involved, and those uninvolved by the incident or treaty should understand that it is not their issue -- not their place to take a 'moral' (read: imperialist) stance in the international sphere. In this way we gain a world where different viewpoints, moralities and politics can develop to their fullest and each go their own separate ways, each conflicting, but each respecting. There will always be debates and arguments over political and philosophical matters, but these remain as debates and arguments, and not as coercion led by an imperialistic conception of morality.
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For years now there have been constant complaints about what have colloquially become known as 'curbstomp' wars -- that is, wars where a dozen alliances take on just one or two alliances and destroy them without breaking a sweat. Hitherto I had never given this much thought, being as it is the sort of faux moral outcry we're used to on Planet Bob from political opponents -- despicable when it's the enemy, glorious comeuppance when it's a friend. But with the current political ground unsteady and the prophecies of a new world order from certain unsavoury elements, one can't help but wonder 'what if the current structure did disappear tomorrow and something else replaced it, what then?' Curbstomps take place when a not-so-well connected alliance has done something to annoy a well connected alliance (usually espionage or a terrible diplomatic move), with the resulting sides being incredibly uneven. The sides develop quite naturally. The connected side tries to stack the odds in its favour as far as is physically possible (this is the entire basis of 'mutual aggression' in treaties), and allied alliances become all too keen to jump on board and get a bit of target practice,. The less connected alliance suffers a flight from its sphere of influence -- allied alliances fleeing the scene as they note the terrible mistake made and the unconquerable odds against them. We are forced then to ask, under a new hegemonic structure, is this likely to change? In the former case, will alliances suddenly put themselves at unnecessary risk, will they shun the idea of honouring mutual aggression treaties, will they suddenly lose the desire for easy action? In the latter case, will alliances suddenly defend the indefensible, will they sacrifice themselves on the alter of futility? In both cases it seems unlikely. The actions taken during a typical curbstomp are the epitome of rational thought, and no strategic mind would take any different action outside of exceptional circumstances. The only alternative then is the possibility that in this new structure everyone is equally connected, thus a curbstomp becomes impossible -- that is to say, we are in a perpetual pre-great war situation. But this is an impossible situation. Either one side would diplomatically outmanoeuvre the other and the sides would become uneven, tending again towards 'connected' and 'not connected', or a great war would break out with the same outcome. We can begin to recognise then that curbstomps are an integral part of our world, regardless of the alliances involved. Alliances will never sacrifice themselves on either side -- whether it be the attacked looking for better odds, or the defender's allies looking to save themselves for a more worthy fight. We can only break out of the cold, hard, rationality of it during a great war period, where sides have been sized up and are just waiting for the firing gun. -- whatever it may be. Thus to try and blame someone for the phenomenon, or to try and claim that it will suddenly disappear in some mystical new world order, is asinine at best; you can no more remove it from the world than you can remove rationality from the human mind. The cycle of 'curbstomps, great war, curbstomps, great war, curbstomps' is here to stay.
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Of Polls and Politics How often do we see polls, threads and radio shows asking that ultimate of Bobian questions: who is the most powerful [wo]man on the planet? What follows is a rush of gut-instinctual and political nominations, with little thought going into what the question actually means. Thus in order to provide an answer we must first investigate the question: what is power and where does it derive from? Our focus will necessarily be on the latter half of that question, but we cannot move onto that without first establishing what we mean when we discuss 'power'. Power in the political context can only be seen as the ability to make others do what you want them to do, whether they know they are doing it or not. However, in examining where power exists we must be careful not to fall into the correlation/causation trap, seeing power where only coincidence exists. Thus if I want X to do Y and she does, it does not necessarily mean that I exercised any power in the interim (not that this will stop many from claiming otherwise). Power can only be seen to exist where it is exorcised through deliberate actions. Given this definition we can begin to anticipate that not all power is the same -- it is not all utilised in the same way, doesn't always have the same outcomes, and doesn't always have the same fundamental characteristics. On closer examination we can recognise that there are three main types of power: influential, direct, and structural. Influential Power This type of power is all around us here on the forum and, to a lesser extent (given that it has to operate within the confines of structural power) on our respective alliance forums. Indeed, it is the primary objective of most posts to wield: that is to say, to convince and/or manipulate others. Influential Power is the power to convince those that you have no direct contact with to take (or not to take) an action. This need not be of the nature 'I think people should do X' followed by them doing so, but may instead follow from a convincing argument that leads to concrete opinion change and/or actions. Thus if I create a thread arguing that Alliance Z is evil, and this causes a vast change of global opinion towards them, I have exorcised Influential Power. As one might imagine, this is the least concrete type of power, and an individual cannot claim to hold it at a constant rate. Indeed, while certain individuals can certainly lay claim to hold it at a higher base level than others (when Emperor Revenge says something it will always influence more people than if an unknown said the same thing), it is more often tied to a specific idea or statement. Being the least concrete power, it is also the most misrepresented along the correlation/causation line. Generally speaking individuals will only listen to what they already believe, and so it is easy for someone to say something, to see it widely agreed with, and then to claim Influential Power as a result; but without changing any minds on the matter nothing was achieved and no power was exorcised. If, however, that popular claim spurred individuals into concrete action, something was achieved and thus power was exorcised. To give a simple example: if I make the claim that the sky is blue and everyone agrees and pats me on the back, no power has been exorcised. However, if this claim causes people to stop, think, and then head off to carry out in depth experiments on said colour, or to try and change it to a different colour as a result, I can be said to have influenced these actions, and thus Influential Power was exorcised. But it was a fleeting power, not necessarily linked to me but to the assertion, and so I may not carry it past this one instant in time -- though the prestige from this instance may increase my base level. As is becoming increasingly clear, this is a very abstract type of power, and thus very difficult to pin down, and this if further emphasised by its often hidden nature. If an individual has influenced only a few people on a subject, perhaps inside an alliance, and then their view on this subject is spread by these few people to wider masses, then this can legitimately be traced back to the power of the original individual -- it need not come directly from their mouth. In this way one might see the spread of an idea while the the power behind it remains hidden -- additionally, a prime example of how Influential Power may vary from instance to instance, and may well be a 'one hit wonder' never to be repeated. Direct Power This is the power exorcised by personal (direct) contact out with a structural chain of command. Often those wielding this type of power will be seen as the true shapers of the world, as they are visibly seen to cause political movement (forming blocs, alliances, creating enemies, and so forth). As one might expect, this is a power typically held in greatest quantity by the world's diplomats, with their long contact lists, friendships, and ability to influence important people in important alliances, who will then use their own power to further the original objective -- much like influential power a hidden cascade effect often takes place with this type of power. Structural Power Last, but far from least, this type of power is wielded through the structures and institutions of Planet Bob -- that is to say, generally speaking, through alliances. It has often been an underestimated type of power, for it is not always at the forefront of political affairs, but rather behind the scenes organising the other types of power -- you won't find that many alliance leaders personally making the diplomatic rounds or arguing a case on the forum. Structural Power derives its supreme importance from the fact that those with Direct and Influential Power are almost invariably part of a structure, and given this they are almost invariably structurally subordinate to another individual. The importance of this comes from the primacy of this type of power in our world -- no matter how much Direct of Influential Power you may have, you still have to follow the chain of command or you'll quickly find yourself in trouble. This is further emphasised by the fact that often the other types of power derive directly from the structure: diplomats holding Direct Power usually only do so as a result of the access and power they hold as a result of their internal structural position; if that is pulled, or worse, if their structure sabotages them, then their Direct Power will evaporate. Use Value Unfortunately the world is a lot more complex than this, and the three types of power inevitably overlap. As we already noted, Emperor Revenge would hold more Influential Power partly as a result of his Structural Power, but this Structural Power also implies a great degree of Direct Power with other alliance leaders and individuals. Moreover, while this was all written with international politics in mind, it is just as true at alliance level, where individuals exorcise Influential or Direct Power out with, and often in direct contradiction to, Structural Power. But nevertheless, the typology described here is a useful conceptualisation that should aid in any examination of the power structure on Planet Bob at an individual level, if only in bringing about the realisation that power is not homogeneous.
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How often it is that things are reduced to a matter of 'common sense'. It is usually used as a synonym for 'obvious', but its use goes much deeper than that, attempting to stigmatise the one supposedly lacking this sense and brush aside anything more nuanced as intellectual claptrap that flies in the face of what the common man knows to be true. But how does he know it? Almost by definition common sense is unanalysed, unconsidered assumption, learned by assertion from past generations and peers. It is that which is so obvious to the holder that to question it is to step outside the realms of reality and make yourself worthy of little more than ridicule: it is the essence of something being true because it is perceived as being true. Already we can begin to see the problems inherent to it: it puts the cart before the horse, taking the conclusion before the facts. Of course, there are times when it can be used as an appropriate shorthand -- if you walk off a ledge you will fall; if you touch boiling water you will burn; if you don't drink you will thirst. These are things that are all easily and constantly verified through thousands of experiments; they are things experienced by us all in common and with no secondary interpretation open to them. In this way they can legitimately be said to be common sense since they are the absolute lowest level of common experience from which everything else is based. However, we can also recognise that this is not true because it is common sense but because it is scientific -- repeatable experiments confirm the predictions of the hypothesis. Nevertheless it is the scientific method inherent to these most base levels of understanding that give the invocation of common sense such power, and it is this power that scrupulous politicians, in the absence of scientific argument, come to rely on. The problem with common sense is that it is such a big fish in such a small pond that it has to constantly try and break out into larger and more important areas. Not content with its dominance of daily axioms it demands a place in political and historical circles, and it is here that it begins to flounder. While an "unanalysed, unconsidered assumption" may hold in cases of self-evident truths, it does less well in the complex field of empirical-theoretical analysis. Indeed, this is true to such an extent that in my experience the common sense of politics and history is almost universally demonstrated to be wrong by actual scientific inquiry. This is because it is far from the repeatable experiments of of daily common experience that it is instead forced to rely on long chains of assumptions and anecdotes taken from those around it. Indeed, it is flawed to such an extent that the more complex an area becomes the more versions of common sense it produces, inevitably ending in self-contradiction. In this way common sense goes from being scientific to being the worst kind of circular logic. While the facts remain basic, common sense is capable of witnessing the truth of the situation; but when the facts become more complex and open to debate common sense is forced to make an assumption about the truth, and so it becomes: this is common sense because it is true, this is true because it is common sense -- a closed loop that denies contrary opinion and refuses evidence. It is in this way that any appeal to common sense in political or historical matters immediately fails to meet the standard. Beyond the most basic of self-evidents the reasoning of 'because it is' can no longer be considered legitimate or justified. Instead we must replace the belief in common sense with a belief in the scientific motto "Question Everything." Only when politicians and historians learn to live by this new motto will they be able to look the facts in the face and come to an objective, scientific conclusion.
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A Crisis of Memory After nearly 30 months it seems that this one war remains the most intriguing of them all. For the old League mob and their younger patriots it is the glimmer of hope that the Order isn't invincible, while for the Orders it is the moment when they faced down the entire world and came out triumphant. The accepted result of this war seems to move in circles. Immediately after the Great Patriotic War, with the Orders on radio silence, it became common sense among the opposing side that the Orders had lost -- though this belief was constantly shaken as the Orders advanced far ahead of the former coaluetion alliances in economic, military and diplomatic matters. After the First War of Retribution, with the Order back on the forums and the return to active duty of some of its formerly absent political leaders, common sense shot back to the opposite side, and it was accepted by everyone (or at least, few challenges were made to the point) that the war had been either a stalemate or a victory for the Order. More recently it appears that we have finally reached the synthesis, as political affiliation rather than historical fact dictates who won the war. Given this we could take a fascinating look at the evolution of accepted history and the role that the hegemonic military/culture of the day plays in it. But perhaps another time; today it is more important to set straight the events of the war and bring a little more historical accuracy to the debate. Rather than argue from a perspective, linking in the logical conclusions and demonstrating my own point or view, I will instead give a brief overview of exactly what occurred and then place forward my opinion, thus allowing the reader to develop their own unimpeded. The War It is important first of all to give some context leading up to the war. At that time on Planet Bob the hegemony was the Orders, with their ally Legion playing a passive role (assumed ready to back up the Orders if they were attacked). Outside of this small group the Orders were despised for a catalogue of historical (wars), political ('arrogance'), and emotional (being the one at the top, amongst other things) reasons. Both a cause and a consequence of this is that the Orders were largely isolationist. The many alliances of the world that hated the Orders made numerous attempts to sabotage them, often resulting in war (ODN, NAAC, ICSN, ICP, to name a few). But while these wars made individual alliances impotent for a period of time, it was clear to the Pacifican hierarchy that their relative strength was declining -- while growing much faster than any individual alliance, and faster than all alliances combined in percentage growth, the absolute strength of their would-be enemies was advancing due to sheer numbers to a stage where the Orders would not be able to defend themselves against a concentrated attack. It was disturbing therefore when they also recognised a growing confidence in these alliances to unite with each other for various reasons (although the incompetence of the alliances in question and the skill of the Orders' diplomats slowed it considerably). We can therefore see the context in which the war kicked off, with the potential enemies of the Order becoming strong enough to challenge the hegemony if only they had the confidence to unite, and with that confidence slowly growing as the political dots began to connect. History shows that the Orders didn't act on the alarm bells, primarily due to their confidence in Legion (who hadn't openly succumbed to anti-Pacifican propaganda like GATO) to defend them from an unprovoked attack -- and indeed, if they had, then the oncoming war would have been a relatively easy victory for this group. Had time gone on as it was, it is difficult to believe that the Orders would have allowed themselves to be surpassed so easily, but it was at this point that history threw a curve ball. On a slow night Yaridovich infamously posted his slasher-pornographic stories about various members of the Planet Bob community, among them a particularly ugly one about a female member of the IGC. Yaridovich was promptly banned and the world should have moved on, but it was the reaction among LUE that got to the Orders and many others (notably GATO and ODN as we shall see later). With the thread in question removed from the forum, it was rehosted on the LUE server and their IRC chatroom was abuzz with excitment among both regular and government members as they passed it around. Not one of them stood up to condemn the event until after their fate became clear, and those who joined the channel to complain were promptly banned. To members of the community this was something new, and they reacted with disgust. A room of ODN, GATO, NPO and NpO officials quickly sprung up where LUE was condemned on all sides and an agreement was unanimously reached to punish them militarily. One particularly demonstrative quote from Chris Kaos (soon to be a chief negotiator for the coaluetion and condemning the 'imperialism' of the Orders' attack) went: "what you do is you knock them down and keep them down and then refuse to acknowledge their existance whilst holding them down." Things were set in motion, and without dissent the conclusion was reached: LUE would be attacked for their conduct by a combined force including many alliances from across Planet Bob. So solid was this conclusion that the then NPO Regent, Vladimir, left the events without concern or a second thought. It wasn't until he returned a few hours later that he would find the political situation in turmoil and his nation in nuclear anarchy. So what happened between these two times? The answer lies in two events. The first occurred when Tygaland, attempting to discuss matters with LUE, was repeatedly kicked and banned from their IRC channel while they continued the festivities brought on by Yaridovich's thread. The culmination of events throughout the night led eventually to Tygaland unilaterally launching a nuclear strike against LUE without warning the other allies. With LUE launching a response against both the NpO and the NPO (from my position at the time I know that the NPO would have joined the war regardless, but as a point of fact it is important to remember that LUE attacked first), the war had begun. The second event lay in the Covenant of the Lost, which revealed itself at this time. The President of GATO, it turned out, was a spy, working for a group that had members in the Legion, ODN and NPO governments. After discussion with her colleague in Legion, President Yoda, instead of siding with the Orders as promised, instead launched an all out attack against the NPO. The Orders were able to deal with both of these alliances with ease, with strategic discussions within the Orders at he time not even bothering to discuss post-war damage, as it was believed it would be so minimal. However, with the anti-Order sentiment rife throughout many alliances on Planet Bob, GATO's attack proved to be the spur of confidence that was required. One after another, dozens of alliances declared against the Orders and the forums went ablaze with anticipation that the time had finally come for the Orders to fall (though this anticipation took on an unsavoury form and the forums had to be taken offline for the first time in their history, after numerous warnings, suspensions and bannings failed to calm the members of the newly forming coaluetion). But still the Orders managed to hold strong without losing much ground. What concerned them, however, were reports that two of the larger alliances, the ODN and NAAC, were considering joining the war against them. To head off this threat high ranking Pacifican officials approached their allies, Legion, to discuss their position, which was assumed to be strong after the not-insignificant damage recently taken on Legion's behalf defending them from WSA. Sure enough, and true to their word, Legion promised to join the war. But as time passed by and they remained quiet they were approached again, and this time decided that it would be better to use the threat of their force to prevent NAAC and the ODN from joining -- stating that if either did, then so would Legion. This threat proved toothless, and both alliances joined that night to no response. Pacifican officials continued to approach Legion and continued to receive assurances that they would join the war 'tomorrow'. Despite the entrance of the ODN and NAAC, along with many more smaller alliances, the Orders managed to maintain their position, and, while the entrance of the ODN was placing more pressure at the top, Pacifican strategists continued to predict a relatively painless victory to great cost for the attacking alliances. In this period there was a lot of negotiation, but none that went to achieving a resolution. What came out of them were a number of 24 hour ceasefires, each unilaterally broken by the newly formed coaluetion just before update in an attempt to gain the advantage. But ultimately, if they were to win this war, they needed more fire-power. It was at this point that the Covenant came back into the picture. Frustrated by Legion's continued promises to enter the war and subsequent failures to do so, a couple of Council members vented their feelings in a private room, with one member of the War Council even shouting for war against them after this one had ended. Of course, this member was shouted down and the Emperor made it clear, even in this private discussion, that no retribution would be sought against Legion. But the damage was done. One member of the Alliance Council in that room was a member of the Covenant and forwarded the conversation to his co-conspirators, who, sensing the opportunity, edited them and provided them to Legion's ruling group. With the pushing of the Minister of Intelligence (who was a member of the Covenant) and the underlying anti-Pacifican that had hitherto remained hidden, Legion resolved to attack the Orders that night. Through a series of bureaucratic blunders by the Legion elite, the Pacifican hierarchy quickly found out about the war and approached Legion about it, only to be met with denial after denial and a general refusal to discuss the matter. In an effort to prevent the escalation, the Order even sought out and provided evidence that both GATO and LUE were actively spying on Legion. Sure enough the members were kicked out, but it was only the Orders who were attacked. There is no denying that this was a blow to the Orders. Legion's presence in the top ranks, and with their nations thus far untouched by the war, provided the strategic firepower necessary for the coaluetion to make a go of it. Unsurprisingly, the coaluetion cut off all negotiations at this point, refusing any suggestion of discussion with the Orders. Their earlier impotent demands of the Orders disbanding to them now seemed a foregone conclusion, and discussion was redundant. This was undoubtedly an optimistic view of the situation. While the coalition had a massive number advantage and now had the numbers at the top to try and ram them home, they still lacked the organisation and experience of the Orders, and while many on the political side of the Order could barely see for the thick pessimism hanging over them (to the extent that the Regent was at one point attacked by a member of the Council as unrealistic simply for attempting to move forward on organising the war effort) , the military side maintained that the war was winnable even if all alliances continued fighting [a massive nuclear assault was lined up against Legion for the day after they left the war and their exit proved an ambivalent experience for a number of military commanders]. This carried on for a couple of days, with the battle looking relatively even to the impartial bystander, but the Orders were hard at work negotiating privately with individual alliances so as to gain the clear advantage. It wasn't long before they had convinced both Legion and the ODN (the two alliances causing them the most military trouble due to their top-heavy numbers) to leave the war. This was a massive psychological as well as military blow for the coaluetion, and this is reflected even today in the attitude of many towards the two alliances. But at the time it was fear rather than anger that occupied their minds. With these two alliances leaving independently and without notice, many began to consider that others would do likewise, and no one wanted to be the last one at war (the last one who may not receive a peace -- a situation ruthlessly exploited by Pacifican propaganda). So it was that following the departure of the ODN and Legion there began a trickle and then a flood of smaller alliances leaving the war, many of them offering surrenders as a way of doing so; something that the Orders refused in favour of straight white peace in order to encourage the flood. This grew to such an extent that at one point almost the entire first page of the Open World Forum was made up of alliances trying to escape the war and apologising to the Orders. With this new reality revealed the Orders' negotiators were now able to open each negotiation with the number of coaluetion alliances that had tried to surrender that day, thus highlighting the rapidly weakening bargaining position of those remaining; and more than once a negotiator was heard replying to a demand with 'do you think this is yesterday?'. Where the coaluetion had first demanded unconditional disbandment of both Orders, and then even refused to enter talks, before going back to the original demand after Legion and the ODN left, the demands were now rapidly weakening as the war went on. From the disbandment of both it became simply the disbandment of the NpO, and from there it went for the NpO to leave blue, and from there it became a cash demand, and from there the cash became less and less, until eventually the demand became an apology from the Orders -- also refused -- and then finally a request for a personal apology from Ivan Moldavi, Emperor of the NPO. The Orders' negotiators had been quite unforgiving throughout, hitting the coalution negotiators hard with various tactics and refusing to concede anything significant, even when the war looked at its worst. At this point they knew that the war was, in the long run, won for them. CDS, another of the large alliances, had agreed to leave the war the next day, and many more were likely to follow as they had been throughout the previous few days. But the situation was not that easy. Despite their conduct in the war, the Order had lost a lot of strength, while the losses on the coaluetion side were spread over a wider range of alliances and nations. It was recognised that losing more strength would make rebuilding exponentially more difficult, and so an outright tactical victory through forcing the collapse of the coaluetion would simultaneously mean a potential strategic defeat in the long term. Given this trade off the Orders' decided that the latter was the better option. So it came that in the face of victory the Orders lay down their arms and the war drew to a close. [1] The above is as impartial a telling of the story of the Great Patriotic War as is possible. The analysis to follow too will aim to be as impartial as possible, but with the understanding that anything that doesn't state 'the coaluetion won' in the most emphatic of terms will be shouted down as biased in certain quarters, we have kept it separate so as to leave the story of the war as uncontroversial as possible. It is my hope that this will be of use to future historians as well as this specific debate. [2] More specifics can be found in the youtube video I created at the time: http://uk.youtube.com/watch?v=kiQVsj0QZrk. Though the video is obviously from a propaganda perspective, the quotes it provides are accurate and of great use to the historian. Who won? What is it to win? To achieve your original goals? There have been claims that, taking this parameter, it is clear that the coaluetion won. Their goal was to prevent LUE from destruction and this was achieved. But was it? The context of events sheds light on another view, where not only were the main movers in the war unconcerned with LUE's survival, but a number of them actively agreed to attack them beforehand! Of the three main players in the war, this was the story of GATO and the ODN, with the third, Legion, supposedly entering due to a threat on themselves. No, this story doesn't hold together. It seems clear to me that the majority of alliances entering the war did so out of a long historical hatred of the Orders and a desire to see the world without them. Indeed, many were unapologetic about this even in the heat of war, most notably the Emperor of another major player, Prodigal Chieftain of the GGA. Retrospectively we can see likewise for GATO (led by a spy network determined to destroy the Orders) and Legion (who entered on the flimsiest of evidence to secure their position at the top). Moreover, most of the other alliances who entered did so by a network of 'chained' MDPs -- that is to say, Alliance A attacked Alliance X, Alliance X is therefore de facto attacking Alliance A, thus to defend alliance A is a defensive act -- and most of the smaller alliances did so out of a rather vocal anti-Pacifican spirit rather than anything else. Indeed, that was the propaganda of the day, not to defend LUE (since no one actually wanted to), but to crush the Orders! If we therefore take the goal of the coaluetion to be 'crush the Orders', it was clearly a rather colossal failure. Of course, the argument usually evolves from this point, since it is unsustainable in the face of critical thought. Instead the proponents of coaluetion victory argue that they won due to the personal apology offered by Ivan Moldavi (later unilaterally retracted on the basis that it wasn't from the Order as a whole). This is a complete abandonment of the definition of victory usually used by the same people, but we can skip over that oversight for the purposes here, since the point is incorrect anyway. With the war going against them the coaluetion made a last ditch effort to save face by asking for an apology. This is little more than a token gesture by a side on their way to winning a war in order to end it slightly sooner for long-term strategic reasons. Can a losing army claim that as a victory, despite the gesture being a mockery of everything it fought for? To answer in the affirmative surely comes with the direst stench of desperation. What about the Orders' original goals? Given the discussion with GATO and the ODN mentioned in the previous section, it was explicitly to teach LUE a lesson, if not destroy them completely, and this has never been denied. Were they punished? The fact that it is difficult to say would suggest not as much as the Orders would have liked. While their strength plummeted and a wave of defeatism washed over them in the early days, arguably 'teaching them a lesson' about what they did, they nevertheless emerged as a centre-point in the coaluetion and built up a significant influence as a result -- something that was perhaps more important to them. If the war had gone on there is little doubt in my mind that LUE would have been left to fight alone and would have been destroyed, but this isn't what occurred, as the Order took the strategic option and instead destroyed them some 6 months later. With neither side achieving their original goals we could easily stop here and call it a stalemate as many have done in the past, most eloquently by Comrade Z'ha'dum. But I disagree. What is a stalemate? It would seem to me that it is a situation where neither side can advance at any speed, and thus the war ends due to no one being able to move forward. This was clearly not the situation in the Great Patriotic War, where one side was being struck by an epidemic of surrenders while the other took control. If the side that is actually winning the war then agrees to pull out at the desperate requests of the losing side, what do we call that? Humanitarianism? Perhaps a strategic withdrawal would be more apt. But a strategic withdrawal in these material conditions does not offer the same negative connotations as we have come to take from it. In a strategic withdrawal here there is no ground conceded, nothing lost. If the objectives have been taken as far as they can be then a strategic withdrawal is the only sensible option and cannot be considered a negative action. Of course, this must be qualified somewhat. In the case of this strategic withdrawal the withdrawing side was the only side capable of victory -- and thus the only side capable of ending the war. To use an example, if you are in a fight with and have knocked your opponent to the ground and he is unable to move, then leaving that fight to get to work on time does not mean that you lost, or indeed, even that you drew -- I will not begrudge you claiming later on that you won, despite withdrawing for other reasons, even if your objective was incomplete. Taking these points to their logical conclusion therefore leaves us with a simple analogy of the coaluetion as the Black Knight and the Orders as King Arthur: "Oh, oh, I see, running away then. You yellow [censoreds]! Come back here and take what's coming to you. I'll bite your legs off!"
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"When you look for a long time into an abyss, the abyss also looks into you." - Friedrich Nietzsche There was recently a short debate on the place of morality in the international sphere where I argued that morality was unique to each individual alliance, a result of their particular socio-political system and place in the world. In other words, ones morality is derived from their perspective, with the salient cause being their choice of alliance. Of course, you could nitpick at various details of this, but for the purpose of this discussion suffice to say that the broad outline provided is historically and empirically self-evident. Returning to the path of the aforementioned debate, where does this leave the international sphere? Following from the above it must be an inherently amoral place. It has no structure or power of its own (as an alliance does, making it fundamentally different in nature), and as such is a vacuum that merely provides a stage for the moralities of elsewhere to showcase themselves. But we must go further than this in realising that the various moralities are not cooperative in nature; they do not happily coexist, supporting and furthering each other. No, they are the most competitive of things, condemning, raging and battling against one another for hegemony in the centre ground. Of course, it is impossible for one morality to gain this hegemony in any meaningful sense precisely due to the lack of structure, and so the battle perpetually rages on. Why can they not coexist happily? It is again self-evident, but I'm sure many would demand a response. Moralities are not abstract feel-good things, they have very real and practical political consequences. Take the Pacifican view of war against an alliance where only the leadership can be said to have clearly 'sinned', for example, against the view of many other alliances -- for the former it is morally legitimate while for the latter it may seem the pinnacle of barbarity and imperialism. The result is a great tension that may materialise in any number of ways, but the one thing that is certain is great moral conflict. Having discussed the nature of the international sphere -- amoral, competitive, anarchic -- we can begin to realise why this short article is titled 'The Great Abyss'. The international sphere is a vacuum that exists only by virtue of what the various alliances put into it; remove such inputs and the international sphere itself is nothing. What then of those who reside in this international sphere. They may be allianceless, or simply more interested in the international sphere than their formal place of residence, but the important point is that the international sphere becomes their environment, and thus their perspective: they become children of the international. To some idealists this may sound like an exciting concept. Apparently (though in reality not) free of military constraints and social superstructures, these children are open to everything! But this is exactly the problem. As they wander the battlefield of the Abyss they begin to take on its eclectic qualities, following nothing through to its logical conclusion, and instead taking on a bit of this and a bit of that. One might think that they do so with the best of methods, but they cannot judge the war by viewing the battle. With no grounding in the material realities of an alliance they cannot understand the perspectives and motivations that one takes on outside of the international sphere. By looking into the Abyss they become the personification of it: often excited, occasionally adventurous and sometimes articulate, but in the final analysis always empty.